Maryland Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 1

Article 6

The Headless Class Action: the Effect of a Named
Plaintiff 's Pre-certification Loss of a Personal Stake

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
The Headless Class Action: the Effect of a Named Plaintiff's Pre-certification Loss of a Personal Stake, 39 Md. L. Rev. 121 (1979)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/6

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

COMMENT
THE HEADLESS CLASS ACTION: THE EFFECT OF A
NAMED PLAINTIFF'S PRE-CERTIFICATION
LOSS OF A PERSONAL STAKE
[W]e . .. have before us no one who has a continuing stake in the
controversy, only a potential lawsuit searching for a sponsor . . . a

headless lawsuit with, in effect, no plaintiff.'
The dominant spirit that haunts this enchanted region, and seems to be
commander-in-chief of all the powers of the air, is the apparition of a
figure on horseback without a head. It is said by some to be the ghost of
a Hessian trooper, whose head had been carried away by a cannon-ball,
in some nameless battle during the Revolutionary War ....
[T]he body
of the trooper, having been buried in the churchyard, the ghost rides
forth to the scene of the battle in nightly quest of his head.. . . The

spectre is known, at all the country2 firesides, by the name of the
Headless Horseman of Sleepy Hollow.

A procedural issue that has recurred in federal class action litigation is
what effect - if any - should the pre-certification loss of a named
plaintiffs personal stake in a case have on a purported class action. A great
deal may hinge on a court's resolution of this problem. The possibly
meritorious claims of the persons alleged to be members of the class may go
unremedied, and one of the fundamental policies supporting the class action
3
device - the conservation of judicial resources - may be disserved.
Following a discussion of the nature of the problem, the pertinent
Supreme Court decisions and the current judicial treatment of the issue will
be analyzed. A rule will then be recommended to prevent the problem from
arising, and a remedial procedure proposed to be employed when it does.
I.

THE PROBLEM AND

How IT ARISES

A plaintiff in federal court who alleges the existence of a class and seeks
to represent it has the burden of proving that all the requirements of rule 23
have been satisfied. 4 He must demonstrate that it is impractical to bring all
the persons purported to be members of the class before the court,5 that there
are questions of law or fact common to the entire class, 6 that his claims or
1. Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 557 F.2d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 1977) (Gee, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008).
2. W. IRVING, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow, in THE SKETCH BOOK 351-52 (1954).
3. See text accompanying notes 234 to 248 infra.
4. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1759, at
578 (1972).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
6. Id. 23(a)(2).

(121)
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defenses are typical of those of the class, 7 and that he will adequately
represent the absent class members." The alleged class must also fall within
one of the three categories in which a class action has been deemed to be an
appropriate procedural vehicle. 9
If the plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the court will "certify" that
a class exists, 10 and approve the plaintiff as its representative." The
Supreme Court has held that once a class is certified, it acquires "a legal
status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff]."' 2 The
existence of such an independent legal status is marked by the procedural
13
consequences that certification triggers.
Either before or after the certification of a class, it may come to light
that the named plaintiff has lost or never had a personal stake in the
outcome of the case. This may occur for one of three reasons. First, it may be
demonstrated that the plaintiffs claim is meritless, that he has not suffered
a wrong for which the law will give a remedy. 14 Second, the plaintiffs claim
may be satisfied by a judicial determination in his favor or by the
defendant's capitulation.' 5 And third, the plaintiffs once valid claim may
become inappropriate for judicial remedy due to the passage of time, a
change in the law, or the performance of the conduct requested by the
16
plaintiff by the defendant with no design to end the action.
7. Id. 23(a)(3).
8. Id. 23(a)(4).
9. Under rule 23(b), the plaintiff must prove one of the following: (1) that a class
action is necessary to avoid possible adverse effects on the opponents of the class or
on the absent members of the class; (2) that the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) that questions of law
or fact common to the class are present and that the class action device is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Id.
23(b)(1) to 23(bX3). See generally 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1002
(1977); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1759. For an excellent summary of
rule 23's requirements, see Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 580-82 (D.
Md. 1979).
10. Although the term "certification" does not appear in rule 23, it has become the
shorthand description for a judicial determination under rule 23(c)(1) that "an action
brought as a class action. . . shall ... be so maintained." See generally 7 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1785.
11. FED. R. Cr. P. 23(a)(4).
12. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975). See text accompanying notes 26 to 39
infra.
13. First, once certified, the class action may not be settled or dismissed without
the court's approval. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Second, if the action results in a judgment
on the merits, the decision - whether favorable or unfavorable - will bind all
members of the class. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 415 (White, J., dissenting). See
generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1789. Third, if the action is one
being brought under rule 23(b)(3), certification marks the point at which notice must
be given to all class members of the institution of the action, their right to enter their
appearances through counsel, and their option to exclude themselves from the class
by "opting out." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 1777.
14. See pp. 151-63 infra.
15. See pp. 138-50 infra.
16. See pp. 131-38 infra.
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When the named plaintiff loses his stake in the case after a class has
been properly certified, the Supreme Court has held that the action may
continue if a controversy remains between the members of the class and the
defendant. 17 With little direction from the Supreme Court, judicial reaction
to the plaintiffs loss of his stake before certification, however, has been
confusing and inconsistent, and cannot be explained merely on the basis of
factual differences among the cases. Courts have alternatively held that: (1)
the demise of the plaintiffs individual claim has no effect on the
continuation of the action;1s (2) the action may continue but without further
participation by the stakeless plaintiff;1 9 (3) the case must be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there is not the "case or
controversy" required by article III of the Constitution, 20 the plaintiff no
17. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24
(1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). There
has been considerable law review commentary on the post-certification loss of a
named plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a class action. E.g., Champlin,
Personal Stake and Justiciability:Application to the Moot Class Action, 27 KAN. L.
REV. 85 (1978); Kane, Standing, Mootness and Federal Rule 23 - Balancing
Perspectives,26 BUFFALO L. REV. 83 (1976); Comment, Continuationand Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 573; Comment, A Search for Principlesof Mootness in the Federal Courts: Class
Actions, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289 (1976); Note, Does Mooting of the Named PlaintiffMoot
a Class Suit Commenced Pursuantto Rule 23 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure?,
8 VAL. U.L. REV. 333 (1974). See generally Developments in the Law - Class Actions,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1463-71 (1976).
18. E.g., Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468
F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1972). For a collection of cases holding to this effect, see Annot., 33
A.L.R. Fed. 484, 497-506 (1977).
19. E.g., Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978).
20. Chief Justice Warren defined the case or controversy requirement in Flast v.

Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1967):
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary
but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And
in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of
art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal
courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.
Because its invocation is an exercise in judicial self restraint, the justiciability
doctrine is "peculiarly self-regarding," L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 53
(1978), framing the limits of the functional competence of the federal courts as those
limits are perceived by the judiciary itself. See 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
4, § 3529, at 146-54; Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the
"Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Note, What
Constitutes a Case or Controversy Within the Meaning of Article III of the
Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REV. 232 (1927). As Justice Frankfurter candidly suggested,
"[wihether 'justiciability' exists ... has most often turned on evaluating both the
appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts and the hardship of denying
judicial relief." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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longer having standing, 21 or the case having become moot;2 2 or (4) the action
must be dismissed because the stakeless plaintiff can no longer meet the
21. E.g., Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975). Standing
is one component of the article III case or controversy requirement. It focuses
primarily on the party who is seeking to gain access to a court rather than on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 79-113; 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 3531; Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645
(1973). To have standing, a party must allege "that the challenged action has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise," Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org'ns, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (emphasis added), and must have a
"sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain a judicial resolution
of that controversy," Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). In its most recent
case on standing, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 98 S. Ct.
2620 (1978), the Supreme Court summarized its recent cases as establishing two
constitutional requirements for standing: injury in fact to the plaintiff and a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. Id. at 2630-31. The
standing requirement is tested at the threshold of the lawsuit, and the mere allegation
of a judicially cognizable injury is sufficient to satisfy it. Proof of the merits of the
claim goes to the ultimate right to judgment, rather than to the initial standing
inquiry. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
Threshold individual standing is a prerequisite for all actions, including class
actions, and must be satisfied by an aspiring class representative in addition to the
rule 23 requirements. See generally 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 9, §§ 1040, 1045 & 1070.
As explained by the Supreme Court:
A named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing his action on
behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them
standing had they been named plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person
cannot predicate standing on an injury which he does not share. Standing
cannot be acquired through the back door of a class action.
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1974).
22. E.g., Bradley v. Housing Auth., 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975). Mootness is
another component of the case or controversy requirement. A case is "moot," and
hence non-justiciable, if the passage of time has caused it to lose "its character as a
present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if [a court is] to avoid advisory
opinions on abstract propositions of law." Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 62-69; 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 3533; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Mootness Doctrine]; Note, Mootness on Appeal in the
Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mootness on
Appeal]. This may occur because a party has died, e.g., Durham v. United States, 401
U.S. 481 (1971); because the applicable law has changed, e.g., United States v. Alaska
S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920); because the defendant has tendered the relief requested
by the plaintiff, e.g., California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1893);
because the alleged wrongful behavior has ceased and could not reasonably be
expected to recur, e.g., SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406
(1972); or because the plaintiff could no longer be affected by a challenged statute, e.g.,
Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
Apart from the basic elements of the case or controversy requirement of
article III, mootness doctrine is also shaped in large part by prudential judicial
concerns. In applying the mootness label, courts seek to prevent the useless
expenditure of judicial resources and to assure that they are presented with a
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requirements of rule 23(a) that his claim be "typical" of those of the class
23
and that he "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
genuinely adversarial case, one in which all claims are likely to be presented
vigorously and extensively. See Mootness Doctrine,supra, at 375; Note, Cases Moot
on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 773-74 (1955).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has evinced that elements of the mootness doctrine find
their roots not only in constitutional dictates, but also in more flexible considerations
of policy. See, e.g., Kremans v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 127-32 (1977); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1976). Professor Tribe has suggested that
"the public interest in efficient and flexible judicial administration cannot alone
confer article III jurisdiction absent a real 'case' or 'controversy' but it can be relevant
in shaping a satisfactory conception of what counts as such a 'case' or 'controversy'
in an otherwise borderline situation." L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 68 n.34 (emphasis in
original).
There are two occasions on which a court will exercise this discretionary
element in the mootness inquiry and depart from a strict application of article III to
hear a case that appears to be moot. See generally Mootness on Appeal, supra;
Comment, A Search for Principlesof Mootness in the Federal Courts: PartOne - The
ContinuingImpact Doctrines, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1289 (1976). These situations have been
erroneously characterized as "exceptions" to the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., 1 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 9, § 1058, at 148-51. It is more accurate to recognize them as
occasions on which courts have expanded the definition of a "case" and a
"controversy" by finding that the underlying policies of article III are met despite the
absence of a "live" plaintiff. See L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 68 n.34.
The first class of seemingly moot cases over which a court will retain jurisdiction
are those falling within the rubric "capable of repetition, yet evading review." In these
cases, although the controversy's effect on a plaintiff is by its very nature of a limited
duration and it is unlikely that any person will retain a live stake throughout the
course of the litigation, the actions complained of are likely to be repeated. Such cases
present the possibility of a recurring but judicially irremediable wrong unless
jurisdiction is retained. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165 n.6
(1977) (pen register order of limited duration); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) ("gag order" limited to duration of trial); Super Tire Eng'r Co. v.
McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) (welfare benefits to striking workers); Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911) (short term ICC rate order); Mootness
Doctrine, supra, at 383-88. The Court has held that the challenged conduct may be
"capable of repetition" with respect to someone within a class of persons represented,
although not with respect to the particular plaintiff himself. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (other pregnant women denied abortions, even after plaintiff's term of
pregnancy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year voter residency
requirement applicable to others who move into voting district).
A second group of apparently moot cases over which jurisdiction has been
retained are those in which the plaintiff's claim is satisfied by the defendant's
voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct where it is likely the conduct will be
repeated. E.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); see text
accompanying notes 133 to 139 infra. Cases in which potential repetition was not
found sufficiently likely include Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974)
(unlikely that plaintiff would return to law school after graduation and again be
subject to allegedly unconstitutional admission policies); and SEC v. Medical Comm.
for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972) ("speculative" that committee would
resubmit its proposal to be included in proxy solicitation of defendant corporation and
again be unlawfully denied access).
23. E.g., Banks v. Multi-Family Management, Inc., 554 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1977).
The "typicality" requirement, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), focuses on whether the
representative's interests are truly aligned and consistent with those of the class
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AND ITS PROGENY

Because rule 23 contains no provision concerning the effect of the
named plaintiffs loss of his personal stake in the case before certification,
several recent Supreme Court decisions provide the only real guidance on
the matter. The Court has prescribed that if the named plaintiff loses his
stake in the case after the class has been properly certified, the action may
continue if a controversy remains between the defendant and the members
of the class. 24 However, despite some instructive language, the Court has not
yet established the proper judicial treatment when such a loss occurs before
25
a class is certified.

members. See Donelan, Prerequisites to Class Actions Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 527, 534-38 (1969); Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and
Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of Federal Rule 23, 53
B.U.L. REV. 406 (1973). Factual differences will not necessarily render a claim
atypical if the representative's claim arises from the same event, practice, or course of
conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class and is based on the same legal
theory. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1764, at 610-14. For example, it
has been held that the typicality requirement may be satisfied even though varying
fact patterns support the claims or defenses of individual class members, e.g., Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and even though there is a disparity
between the damages claimed by the representative and those claimed by the other
members of the class, e.g., Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480 (W.D. Pa.
1977); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The "fairness and adequacy" of representation factor, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4),
goes to the ability of the representative to pursue a course of conduct beneficial to the
absent class members as well as to the capability of the plaintiffs attorney to serve as
counsel to the class. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1766;
Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 17, at 1471-77. To satisfy this
provision of the rule, courts have held that the aspiring representative must show that
he is capable of "waging a real fight," Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting Z.
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 68 (1950)), and have considered several factors
to be significant in such a determination. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supranote 9, § 1120. The
representative must have interests sufficiently similar to those of the absent class
members that he will vigorously prosecute the suit on their behalf. Id.; e.g., Rodriguez
v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (D. Ill. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 403 U.S. 901 (1971);
Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 4, § 1767. Courts have stated that the plaintiffs attorney must be
qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation. E.g.,
Amos v. Board of Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (E.D. Wis. 1976). See generally 7
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1766, at 632-35. Finally, some courts have
required a showing that an aspiring representative have interests that are not
antagonistic or in conflict with the objectives of those he purports to represent. E.g.,
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Feliciano v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 656
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1768.
24. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
25. For two excellent summaries of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, see
13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 3533, at 126 (Supp. 1979), and Champlin,
supra note 17.
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In the seminal case in the area of class actions and justiciability, Sosna
v. Iowa,26 the Court held that once a class is certified, an action may
continue even though the plaintiffs individual claim has become moot, and
that the plaintiff may continue as the class representative notwithstanding
the loss of a personal stake in the case. Sosna was a class action brought to
challenge Iowa's one-year residency requirement for divorces. The district
court certified the class 27 but ruled against it on the merits. Before the
Supreme Court reviewed the case, the named plaintiff satisfied the residency
requirement, thus losing her personal stake in the case. The Court
nonetheless found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on behalf of the
class. Noting that class certification sets into motion both a res judicata
effect 28 and a requirement of court approval before settlement or dismissal, 29
the Court posited that once certified, "the class of unnamed persons
described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the
interests asserted by [the named plaintiff]." 30 Hence the class itself could
satisfy the case or controversy requirement: "[A]lithough the controversy is
no longer live as to [the named plaintiff], it remains very much alive for the
class of persons she has been certified to represent."'31 As a rationale for its
holding, the Court pointed out that this case fell within the ambit of the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine. 32 Because the issue
sought to be litigated in the case would escape full appellate review if it were
dependent upon the efforts of "any single challenger," it should not become
moot by "the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named
plaintiff. '3 3 Further, although the residency requirement would not again be
enforced against the named plaintiff, its enforcement was "capable of
34
repetition" against the other members of the class.
The Court placed two limitations on future applications of its holding.
There must be a named plaintiff who presents "a controversy at the time the
complaint is filed, and at the time the class is certified by the District Court
pursuant to Rule 23. . .35 and "there must be a live controversy at the time
[an appellate court] reviews the case" between either the defendant and the
named plaintiff or the defendant and a member of the class. 36
Having found article III to be no bar to the continuation of the action,
the Court reevaluated the issue of adequacy of representation under rule

26. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
27. The parties had stipulated that the requirements of rule 23 were satisfied. Id.
at 397-98.
28. Id. at 399 n.8. After certification, a judgment on the merits will bind all those
found to be class members at the time of certification. See note 13 supra.
29. 419 U.S. at 399 n.8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
30. 419 U.S. at 399.
31. Id. at 401.
32. Id. at 399-400. See note 22 supra.
33. 419 U.S. at 401.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 402.
36. Id.
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23(a)(4) in light of the demise of Mrs. Sosna's personal stake in the case.
This analysis, the Court stressed, was independent of the article III issue:
[The] conclusion [that article III is satisfied] does not automatically
establish that appellant is entitled to litigate the interests of the class
she seeks to represent, but it does shift the focus of examination from
the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative
' 37
to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Finding no evidence of conflicting interests among the class members and
noting that "the interests of [the] class had been competently urged at each
level of the proceeding" by Mrs. Sosna, the Court concluded that the
requirement of rule 23(a)(4) would be satisfied by her continuation as class
38
representative.
Although Sosna involved a class that had already been certified, a
marginal note addressed the problem of a plaintiff's loss of a personal stake
prior to certification:
There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named
plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district
court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion. In
such instances, whether the certification can be said to "relate back" to
the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the
39
issue would evade review.
This rather cryptic language is the Court's most significant contribution to
the resolution of the problem of a plaintiffs loss of a personal stake before
certification; it suggests that at least some such actions may continue, but
provides little help in deciding which.
The holding and the dictum of Sosna have been clarified by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. In Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo., 4° the

37. Id. at 403 (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a)(4)).
38. Id. A strong dissent by Justice White questioned Mrs. Sosna's ability to
continue as class representative after her personal stake in the case had ended:
The unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants remain.
None of the anonymous members of the class is present to direct counsel and
ensure that class interests are being properly served. For all practical
purposes, this case has become one-sided and has lost the adversary quality
necessary to satisfy the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. A
real issue unquestionably remains, but the necessary adverse party to press it
has disappeared.
Id. at 412 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 402 n.11.
40. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Franks involved a class challenge to allegedly
discriminatory hiring and transfer practices. The Court found that although the
named plaintiff, a black truck driver, had been discharged for cause during the
pendency of the appeal, the action was not moot and could continue because a class
had been certified before his discharge.
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Court held that once a class is certified, the loss of the plaintiffs personal
stake in the action does not dictate dismissal, even if the issues with which
the case is concerned are not "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
The statement in the Sosna opinion that the issues dealt with there were
"capable of repetition, yet evading review," the Court explained, was merely
a comment on the temporal nature of the issues in that case and was not
meant to limit the holding to cases with issues of a similar nature. 4'
The dictum in the Sosna "relation back" footnote was applied in
Gerstein v. Pugh,4 2 a class action that challenged the constitutionality of a
state's rule regulating pretrial detention in criminal cases. Before the district
court certified the class, the named plaintiff was convicted and removed
from detention under the statute. Citing Sosna and its footnote eleven, the
Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal even though the
plaintiff had had no personal stake in the case at the time of certification.
Because the claim was one "capable of repetition, yet evading review," 43 the
Court applied the holding of Sosna to permit the action to continue.
Although there was no live plaintiff at the time of certification as required
by Sosna, the Court applied the "relation back" footnote of that case because
it was doubtful "that any given individual named as plaintiff, would be in
,,44
custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class ....
41. Id. at 754. The Court further stated: "Thus, the 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review' dimension of Sosna must be understood in the context of mootness as
one of the policy rules often invoked by the Court. . . .'[These rules] find their source
in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations.'" Id. at 756 n.8 (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). The Supreme Court has also applied Sosna in
the following cases: Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977) (after class certified
in action assailing state statute concerning commitment to mental health institutions,
statute was amended in such a way as to moot named plaintiffs' individual claims
and some of those of class members; Court remanded for "reconsideration of the class
definition, exclusion of those whose claims are moot, and substitution of class
representatives with live claims."); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n.1 (1976)
(only stipulation for intervention of additional plaintiff saved suit challenging prison
disciplinary procedures from dismissal when one named plaintiff died and the other
was paroled before certification); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 430 (1976) (school desegregation class action would be moot without intervention
of the United States because named plaintiffs had been graduated and no class
certified); Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (per curiam)
(appeal dismissed as moot because class action not "properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court" before named plaintiffs individual claims
became moot). See generally 13 C. WRIGHr & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §3533 (1979
Supp.).
42. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

43. Id. at 110 n.11.
44. Id. The Court also found significant the certainty that a class of persons would
continue to suffer from the challenged detention and the fact that the public defender
who represented the named plaintiffs had "other clients with a continuing live
interest in the case." Id. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.ll (1978) (Sosna's
"relation back" footnote applied to case involving challenge to state officials' taking
exceptions before juvenile court judge to master's proposed findings of nondelinquency; although state had withdrawn its exceptions to findings on named plaintiffs
before class certified, case allowed to continue because it fell within "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" doctrine).
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In East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc., v. Rodriguez, 45 the Court

addressed an issue it had cursorily examined in Sosna in the postcertification context,46 the propriety of permitting a plaintiff to serve as a
class representative when, prior to certification, he loses or is shown never to
have had a personal stake in the case. Rodriguez was an employment
discrimination suit purported to be a class action. Because the named
plaintiffs' counsel had not moved for certification, however, the district court
considered only their individual claims. Finding the plaintiffs unqualified
for the positions they sought, the district court entered judgment against
them, not reaching the class issue. 47 The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit's reversal "for the simple reason that it was evident by the time the
case reached [the court of appeals] that the named plaintiffs were not proper
class representatives under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).' '48 The Court based this
conclusion on three factors. First, the named plaintiffs "were not members
of the class of discriminatees they purported to represent. . ." because once
it had been demonstrated at trial that they had suffered no discrimination, it
was clear that their claims were meritless. 49 Second, the plaintiffs' ability to
represent the class was placed in doubt by their failure to move for
certification prior to trial. 5° And third, a vote by the members of the
purported class had evidenced a disagreement between a substantial
number of those persons and the named plaintiffs with respect to the kind of
relief that should be sought.51 In a footnote, the Court distinguished the
factual situation in Sosna, in which it had permitted the named plaintiff to
continue as class representative after her claim had become moot:
"Obviously a different case would be presented if the District Court had
certified a class" before the named plaintiffs' claims were shown to be
meritless. 51 In a case such as Rodriguez in which no class had been certified
"the decision whether the named plaintiffs should represent a class is
appropriately made on the full record, including the facts developed at the
'5 3
trial of the plaintiffs' individual claims.
Through Sosna and its progeny, the Supreme Court has established that
once a class is certified, the plaintiff's loss of his personal stake in the

45. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
46. See 419 U.S. at 403; text accompanying notes 26 to 39 supra.
47. Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 40, 48-50 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
48. 431 U.S. at 403.
49. Id. at 404.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 405.
52. Id. at 406 n.12.
53. Id. The effect of Rodriguez on the formerly liberal application of rule 23(a)(4)
class actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e- 17 (1976), is discussed in the text accompanying notes 164 to 169
infra. See generally Comment, The Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class
Actions: A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 175 (1978).
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outcome of a case will not necessarily deprive a court of jurisdiction or
preclude the plaintiff from continuing to serve as the class representative. A
justiciable legal controversy may continue to exist between the certified
class - as an independent legal entity - and the defendant. However, even
if a class has not been certified, the "relation back" footnote in Sosna and its
subsequent application in Gerstein indicate that an action may still
continue after the termination of the plaintiff's interest in the case.5 4 The
courts of appeals are divided on whether the "relation back" exception to the
certification requirement may be applied to cases that, unlike Gerstein, do
not fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" rubric. 55
Moreover, the lower federal courts have not been uniform in their reading of
Rodriguez, some permitting a plaintiff who loses his personal stake in the
case before certification to continue as class representative, and some
ord ring dismissal. 56
III.

CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT

A named plaintiff in a purported class action may lose his personal
stake in the outcome of a case in three distinct ways. His claim may become
moot through the passage of time or a change in the law, it may be satisfied
either by the defendant's capitulation or by a successful invocation of the
judicial process, or it may be shown to be meritless. These three recurring
fact patterns and the current judicial responses to each will be discussed
below.
A.

The Named Plaintiff's Claim Becomes Moot Through No Deliberate
Action of the Defendant

A court may label an action "moot" because there has been a change in
the applicable law, the conduct which the plaintiff asks a court to command
has been performed by the defendant with no design to end the action, or the
time for performance of the challenged conduct has passed. The mooting
event may occur before a district court has an opportunity to rule on class
certification, after the district court has considered and denied a motion for
certification, or after the time at which a reviewing court later determines
that the district court should have reached the certification issue. Courts
have demonstrated an unwillingness to distinguish these three factual
settings, their reactions frequently being the same to each.

54. Indeed, Judge Friendly has opined that the "apparent force" of the general
rule stated in Sosna was "largely drained" by the case's footnote 11. Frost v.
Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
55. Compare Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979) (Sosna's footnote 11 transcends the "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine) with Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (footnote 11 of Sosna narrowly applied).
56. For the divergent judicial and scholarly responses to Rodriguez, see note 166
infra.
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When the plaintiffs claim becomes moot before a district court has had
a chance to reach the certification issue, the case may fall within footnote
eleven of Sosna v. Iowa; 7 a court will permit it to continue if the issues
presented are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 8 In that footnote,
the Supreme Court established an exception to its general rule that for a
class action to survive the loss of the named plaintiffs personal stake in the
case, the plaintiff must have had a "live" claim at the time the class was
certified. The exception applies to "cases in which the controversy involving
the named plaintiff is such that it becomes moot as to them before the
district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification. .. .
Despite arguments that this exception should be read expansively, 60 most
courts have read the subsequent application in Gerstein v. Pugh6 as
defining its limits and found it coextensive with the "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" doctrine. 62 Typical of this position is Langson v.
Simon, 63 in which a beneficiary brought a class action against the Social
Security Administration (S.S.A.) challenging the length of time S.S.A. took
in designating representative payees - persons appointed to receive checks
for disabled recipients. Before the district court could rule on a motion to
certify the class, a new representative payee was assigned to plaintiff and
his payments were resumed. 64 Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground of mootness, the court certified a class. It found that despite the
satisfaction of plaintiffs claim, the action presented issues "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" and thus fell within footnote eleven of Sosna.
The district court read Gerstein as "amplifying" the Sosna exception
by requiring that before a class could be certified the named plaintiff
whose case became moot had to establish that it was certain that there
existed a continuing class of persons suffering the deprivation alleged
and that attorneys representing the named plaintiff were sufficiently

57. 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975). See text accompanying notes 26 to 39 supra.
58. See note 22 supra.
59. 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.

60. See, e.g., Judge Seitz's concurring opinion in Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978), discussed in
text accompanying notes 151 to 156 infra.
61. 420 U.S. 103 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 42 to 44 supra.
62. See e.g., cases cited note 66 infra. At least one court,however, has not
read footnote 11 as being limited by Gerstein. Geraghty v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979). See text
accompanying notes 77 to 98 infra.
63. 74 F.R.D. 456 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
64. Id. at 459. The designation of the new payee occurred through the routine
functioning of S.S.A.'s procedures. There was no evidence that S.S.A. had deliberately
acted to moot the named plaintiffs claim before a class could be certified. On the
effect of a defendant's deliberate attempt to moot a claim, see text accompanying
notes 99 to 138 infra.
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problems of the plaintiff and his class to insure proper
interested in the
65
representation.
The court found that the case before it fell within the amplified exception.
Due to the inherent brevity of the challenged conduct, it would be unlikely
that a court could ever reach the certification issue while the plaintiffs
claim was still valid. Further, there always would be a number of persons
who would receive their checks late because of S.S.A.'s failure promptly to
name a new payee. Finally, the court found that plaintiffs attorneys, as
members of a legal aid bureau, were "experienced in welfare class action[s]
. ..and ... highly interested in and capable of adequately representing the
proposed class.

'66

65. 74 F.R.D. at 460. There was language to this effect in Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 402
n.11, but it is unclear whether the Court was "amplifying" Sosna's footnote 11 or

simply stating the facts as they existed in the case. See note 44 supra.
66. 74 F.R.D. at 460. Accord, Zurak v. Regan, 550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1977); Basel v.
Knebel, 551 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Wohlegemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.
1976); McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1976); Inmates v. Duffy, 528 F.2d 954
(4th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979); Custom v. Trainor, 74
1977); Lavin v.
1977); Robinson v. Leahy, 73 F.R.D. 109 (N.D. Ill.
F.R.D. 409 (N.D. Ill.
1977). A collection of cases holding to
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 73 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Ill.
this effect may be found in Annot., 33 A.L.R. Fed. 484, 493-97 (1977). See White v.
Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1977) (court faced with facts apparently "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" applied footnote 11 of Sosna without mentioning
that doctrine).
Several courts faced with imminent intervention by persons with "live"
claims have permitted an action to continue despite the original plaintiffs claims
becoming moot before certification without invoking either the "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" rubric or the "relation back" doctrine from footnote 11 of
Sosna. In Taylor v. Kerr, 73 F.R.D. 691 (M.D.N.C. 1977), for example, a class action
was filed challenging the admission procedures of a public housing authority. The
plaintiffs initial motion for certification of the class was denied, but the court stated
that it would permit a renewal of the motion at a later time. Before certification could
again be requested, the named plaintiff was accepted for admission to the housing
unit. Id. at 693. Apparently learning of the satisfaction of the original plaintiffs
claims, several other persons who sought admission to the project moved to intervene
and replace her as class representative. These pending motions convinced the court
that should it dismiss the case for mootness, "members of the asserted class would be
ready and able to come forward with a new suit against the defendants." Id. at 694.
The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss and granted the petitions to
intervene. It reasoned:
With the disposal of the motions now before the Court, it appears that the case
will be in proper form for a final pre-trial conference and for a determination
of the definition of the class to be represented. Then it will be ready for trial. It
would be unfair to the parties and a misuse of court time to terminate the
present proceedings at this point and require that the process begin again on
a new complaint.
Id. at 695. Similarly, in Castoe v. Amerada Hess Corp., [1977] TRADE CAS. 61,719
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), the district court permitted an action to continue despite all of the
named plaintiffs' being granted voluntary dismissals before certification by granting
motions to intervene brought by other members of the purported class. The court
reasoned that because an alleged class is assumed to be certifiable from the filing of
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When not faced with issues deemed "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," the majority of the courts that have reached the issue have found
that an action cannot continue if the named plaintiffs claim becomes moot
before certification. 67 In Kuahulu v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 68 for
example, a disabled employee brought an action against his employer's
workmen's compensation insurer and the State of Hawaii after his disability
benefits were discontinued. He claimed a denial of due process because the
payment scheme did not provide a pre-termination hearing. Plaintiffs
motion to amend his complaint to allege the existence of a class of persons
similarly affected was granted. The district court never reached the issue of
certification, dismissing the action on jurisdictional grounds. After being
informed that the state had decided that Kuahulu's benefits should not have
been terminated, the court of appeals held that it could not hear the appeal.
The plaintiff had been granted "all the relief that he could have received if
he had won on the merits,"6 9 and the appeal was therefore moot. The court
distinguished several cases, including Gerstein, in which the named
plaintiffs loss of a stake would not have mooted the class claim. The court
characterized its holding as "very narrow," and emphasized that the
application of the mootness doctrine depended upon "the idiosyncrasies of
each case in which it applied."70
A named plaintiffs claim may also become moot after a district court
has considered and erroneously denied a motion for certification or because
the court has waited too long to reach the certification issue. In these cases,
it is the action or inaction of the district court and not the natural course of
events that causes the plaintiff to lose his stake in the case before a class is
certified. However, most appellate courts have been insensitive to this
distinction, and have generally followed the reasoning of the Kuahulu case.
An example of this judicial myopia is Napier v. Gertrude,71 in which a minor
found to be a "child in need of supervision" by a state juvenile court brought
a habeas corpus class action challenging the statute under which she was
being held. Without ruling on a pending certification motion, the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs individual claim. The plaintiff appealed,
seeking review of the dismissal and arguing that the district court should

the complaint, "a case or controversy may persist between the unnamed class
members and the defendant, notwithstanding the resignation of the original
plaintiffs." Id.
67. E.g., Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); Vun
Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1977). Contra, Geraghty v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979). See
text accompanying notes 77 to 98 infra.
68. 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 1336.
70. Id. at 1337. A qualifying idiosyncracy would presumably be a wrong "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Accord, Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (9th
Cir. 1977) (plaintiff released prior to certification in action challenging the state's
juvenile detention laws).
71. 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
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have certified the class. The court of appeals found that the case did not fall
within either of the two categories in which the plaintiffs loss of her stake
would not moot the action, where the wrong is "capable of repetition, yet
72
evading review," and where the class has already been certified.
Recognizing error in the district court's refusal to consider the certification
motion before reaching the merits of the named plaintiffs claim, the court
found itself powerless to remand the case because it had no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal: "In the absence of certification, even though the absence
results from district court error, technically there is no live controversy on
appeal." 73 The court acknowledged that footnote eleven of Sosna recognized
a court's power "to grant late certification in an otherwise moot case, '74 but
concluded that the factual situation described in the footnote exhausted the
75
circumstances in which that power could be used.
The reasoning employed in Napier and cases of its genre is of
questionable soundness. Although admitting that a class may have been
certified but for the district court's errors, these courts resort to a strict
application of the mootness doctrine in order to find themselves without
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The effect is to allow a recognized instance of
judicial error to go unreviewed and uncorrected. As an advisable alternative,
a court could exercise its discretion under the prudential dimension of the
mootness doctrine
to hear the appeal despite the absence of a technical
"controversy." 76 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has contrived the "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" concept to provide a doctrinal basis for
hearing cases that concededly have intervals without a live controversy. The
exercise of similar judicial resourcefulness would be preferable to an
appellate court's overlooking a district court's misjudgments.
One court has recognized that judicial error in certification determinations ought not be its own shield from appellate review. In Geraghty v.
United States Parole Commission,77 the Third Circuit found that it had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a refusal to certify a class, notwithstanding
the appellant's loss of his personal stake in the case after certification had
been denied. A federal prisoner who had been twice denied parole brought a
class action challenging the validity of the guidelines used by the United

72. Id. at 826 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)).
73. Id. at 827. Accord, Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977); Boyd v.
Justices of Special Term Pt. I, of Superior Court, 546 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. 542 F.2d at 828.
75. Id. The Napier court thus read footnote 11 of Sosna very narrowly.
Compare Napier with Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1975). In Allen, although
affirming the dismissal of a purported class action because the named plaintiff's
claims had become moot before certification, the court indicated that affirmance
would have been inappropriate had "the district court failed to rule on plaintiffs
motion for class action certification 'as soon as practicable after the commencement
of the action.'" Id. at 535 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)).
76. There is a prudential as well as a constitutional dimension to the rule that
courts will not hear moot cases. See note 22 supra.
77. 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 1420 (1979).
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States Parole Commission. The district court denied Geraghty's motion for
class certification because it found his claims to be "untypical" of those of
the class and because it concluded that "class certification [was] neither
necessary nor appropriate.1 78 It then granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff s individual claims. 79 Geraghty appealed
both rulings, but his sentence expired and he was released from prison
before the court of appeals heard oral argument on the case.80
Deciding that it had jurisdiction, the court undertook a lengthy
discussion of the mootness doctrine. Article III requires that "a case
presented for adjudication .

.

. be an actual, concrete dispute over legal

rights" and that "at the commencement of the suit, the dispute. . . concern
some individual plaintiff who is injured by the wrong in question."8 1
However, once such a suit has been initiated it is not essential that the
individual personally harmed "continue to have a live dispute" 82 throughout
the course of the action. Rather, article III demands only that "a legal
controversy exist sufficient to establish that the case is not hypothetical,"
and that the controversy affect "an individual in a concrete case sufficient
to provide the factual predicate for the reasoned adjudication which is the
province of the judiciary. ' 83 In addition to these absolute article III
concerns, a mootness issue presents the more "policy-oriented question"
whether the parties to the litigation have a "sufficient functional adversity
8' 4
to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution."
To support its analysis of the mootness doctrine, the Geraghty court
cited Supreme Court decisions that permitted an action to survive the loss of
the plaintiffs claim if the issues were deemed "capable of repetition, yet
86
evading review," 85 or if in a class action, a class had already been certified.
In those cases, the Court had found that both the constitutional prerequisites of article III and the exigencies of policy were satisfied, and had
retained jurisdiction despite the absence of an individual with a continuing
live stake. The Geraghty court read the Supreme Court's application of
mootness doctrine in the class action context as establishing that an article
III controversy could continue to exist between a class and a defendant even
after the termination of the named plaintiff's claim. 87 Moreover, a lack of

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

429 F. Supp. 737, 740 (M.D. Pa. 1977).

Id.
579 F.2d at 243.
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 247-48 (citing Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)).

86. 579 F.2d at 248-49 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Franks v.

Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
87. Id.
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class certification would not necessarily require dismissal.85 Although a
properly certified class guaranteed that the requirements of "concrete legal
controversy, proper factual predicate, and functional adversity" 89 were met,
these requirements could be met in other ways.
The facts in Geraghty satisfied both components of the case or
controversy requirement despite the pre-certification loss of the plaintiffs
stake in the outcome of the case. The constitutional requirement was easily
met in this case, the court found, because the "fate of numerous federal
prisoners continues to turn in large part on the application of the guidelines
in question." ° To satisfy the discretionary aspect of justiciability, the court
pointed to four factors that compelled against dismissal. First, the case,
"while not wholly congruent, shared many characteristics with the cases
denominated 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' 91 Second, unless
the appellate court were to exercise its jurisdiction over the case, the court's
rule against interlocutory appeals of class certification orders would
"effectively immunize from review such adverse determinations."92 Third,
because the named plaintiffs attorneys had shown a desire to press the
class claims and had another client who sought to intervene, the court found

88. Id. at 250-51. The Parole Commission had argued that Board of School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam), required dismissal. The court
disagreed, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976), and United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), cases in which the
Supreme Court had permitted, in one way or another, an uncertified class to survive
the loss of the named plaintiffs' stakes. The court reasoned that these cases involved
situations in which the underlying dispute continued, and continued to be waged by
active adversaries. 579 F.2d at 251. Jacobs, which involved a first amendment
challenge by students to regulation of their school newspaper, was distinguished on
its facts. Id. at 250. Because the students had been graduated and the paper was no
longer being published, the plaintiff class could not be precisely defined. Furthermore,
the plaintiffs attorney had failed to press for class certification and could not be
trusted thereafter to advance the class interests. Id. In a footnote, the Geraghty court
suggested that "[tihe statements in Sosna, Franks, Gerstein, and East Texas that
justiciability remains 'given a properly certified class' may simply point to
certifiability, not actual certification, as the crucial question." Id. at 249 n.43.
McDonald is discussed in note 127 infra.
89. 579 F.2d at 250.
90. Id. at 251. Implicit in the court's analysis was a reliance on the Gerstein,
Baxter, and McDonald cases as precedent for the ability of an uncertified class to
satisfy the constitutional requirements of mootness doctrine. The rationale used in
Gerstein, that certification "related back," was characterized by the Geraghty court as
a "legal fiction." Id. at 249 n.45. The court had looked behind the "legal fiction" to
find in the factual situation those elements of concreteness and genuine adversity
that it thought were the heart of the constitutional requirement. Gerstein's
precedential value might have been diminished in the Geraghty court's estimation
because Gerstein involved issues "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The
Geraghty court, however, had characterized the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine as a factor to be considered in the policy component, not the
constitutional component, of mootness. See id. at 248-49.
91. Id. at 251.
92. Id.
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a "prima facie case of functional adversity." 93 Finally, the release of the
named plaintiff would not affect the continuing practices of the Parole
Commission or the interests of the members of the putative class. 94 Hence
Geraghty's individual perspective would not be essential; the legal issues
survived his loss intact.
Finding itself on solid jurisdictional footing, the court determined that
the district court had improperly denied certification of the class. The
plaintiff need not have proved that certification was "necessary," as the
trial judge seemed to indicate, but only that there was a proper compliance
with the prerequisites of rule 23. Moreover, although the named plaintiffs
claims may not have been typical of those of all members of the class he
sought to represent, the district court had a duty to divide the class into
subclasses as provided in rule 23(c)(4). 95 The court then reversed the denial
of certification and remanded to the district court for proper division into
96
subclasses.
The approach of the Geraghty decision is praiseworthy. Recognizing
that the district court had erred in failing to certify at least a portion of the
proposed class, the Third Circuit fashioned a convincing argument for
jurisdiction. As Professor Tribe has observed, the question courts really
resolve when they face a claim of mootness is "whether they would be acting
appropriately if they resolved the question which the litigants press upon
them. '97 By resorting to uncompromising invocations of article III, courts
98
have too often substituted rubric for logic.
B.

The Named Plaintiff's Claim Is Satisfied

The named plaintiff in a purported class action may lose his personal
stake in the outcome of a case because he has received all that he was
bringing the action to acquire. This may occur either because the defendant
ceases his challenged conduct or tenders to the plaintiff the claimed
damages, or because the plaintiff wins on the merits of his individual claim
93. Id. at 252, 245 n.21.
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id. at 252-53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) provides: "When appropriate ... an
action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues, or ... a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class ....

"

96. 579 F.2d at 254. On the merits of the case, the court of appeals reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant because it found that
factual issues existed as to whether the parole guidelines violated the Parole
Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§4201-4218 (1976). 579 F.2d at
254-67. The Supreme Court granted the Parole Commission's petition for certiorari. 99

S. Ct. 1420 (1979).
97. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 52.
98. The intellectual honesty of the Geraghty court is commendable. The facts in
the case could easily have been shaded to fit the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception. Rather than summarily applying that label, however, the court
analyzed the case as one "not wholly congruent" with that doctrine. 579 F.2d at 251.
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after the denial of class certification. Because the judicial reaction may
differ depending upon the manner in which the plaintiffs claim is satisfied,
these situations will be analyzed independently.
1. Tender or Voluntary Cessation by the Defendant
When a plaintiff files a complaint with class action allegations, a
defendant could conceivably protect himself from potential class-wide
liability by satisfying the individual claims of that plaintiff either before a
court has a chance to rule on class certification or after a court has denied
certification. In the former case, if either the article III case or controversy
requirement or the provisions of rule 23(a) were strictly applied, the
defendant could strip the named plaintiff of the ability to litigate the class
claims at trial. In the latter situation, once the district court has denied
certification, a rigid application of those principles would preclude an appeal
of the certification decision by the named plaintiff. Judicial reaction to these
circumstances has been inconsistent.
When the defendant tenders the claimed damages or voluntarily ceases
the challenged conduct before the district court has a chance to rule on
certification, some courts have found that the case must be dismissed.
Courts reaching this conclusion have articulated one of two bases for their
decision: either that they no longer have jurisdiction, there being no article
III case or controversy, or that the named plaintiff cannot be an adequate
class representative because he has lost his personal stake in the outcome of
the case.
Representative of the former position is Bradley v. Housing Authority.99
Four applicants for public housing filed a class action alleging that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Kansas City
Housing Authority had violated various statutory and constitutional
provisions by giving preference in tenant selection to persons with high
incomes. Before the district court ruled on the plaintiffs motion to certify the
class, the Housing Authority assigned an apartment to each of the named
plaintiffs.10° Despite the defendants' admission that they had supplied the
apartments to the plaintiffs "'solely because they had filed their action,' "10l

the district court dismissed the case as moot without considering certification of the class. Although it expressed dissatisfaction with the district
court's delay in ruling on certification, 10 2 the court of appeals affirmed the

99. 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).

100. Id. at 627. Several persons who sought to intervene at this stage of the case
were also selected for apartments. Id.
101. Id. (quoting the trial transcript).
102. Id. at 627 n.2. All discovery concerning the existence of a class had been
completed before the Housing Authority satisfied the named plaintiffs' claims and the
plaintiffs' motion for certification was pending. Nevertheless, the district court failed
to issue a ruling on the propriety of class treatment until after the defendants had
mooted the case. Id.
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dismissal of the case as moot. Because the named plaintiffs claims had been
satisfied, and because no class had yet been certified, the court read Sosna v.
Iowa'10 as commanding this result on article III grounds. 1 4 The court did
not consider its decision harmful to the persons in the putative class: "[W]e
think it serves the interests of all concerned that the remaining class begin
anew and thus avoid the legal entanglements of mootness under Sosna
"105

In Banks v. Multi-FamilyManagement, Inc., 06 the Fourth Circuit found
that the defendant's pre-certification satisfaction of the plaintiffs individual
claim made her an inadequate class representative. A tenant in a publicly
subsidized housing project, asking for an injunction to prevent her landlord
from terminating her lease without notice and a hearing, sought to represent
a class of all persons residing in similar housing projects. Before the district
court could rule on a motion to certify the class, the defendant consented to
the entry of a permanent injunction preventing eviction of the plaintiff or
any other resident of the apartment complex without notice and a
hearing. 0 7 Despite plaintiffs objection, the district court agreed to the
consent order and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed
the dismissal, finding that the delay in ruling on certification was not undue
and that the landlord's intervening consent "render[ed] plaintiff an
inappropriate representative for the class sought to be certified."'' 08
The Seventh Circuit has held, however, that a defendant may not escape
potential class-wide liability by satisfying the named plaintiff's claim before

103. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).

104. Id. at 628. The court also cited Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S.
128 (1975) (per curiam). The court's task of disposing of the case on article III grounds
was undoubtedly made easier by several factors it mentioned in conclusion: statutory
changes had occurred that both prevented recurrence of the problem and necessitated
redefinition of the potential class in any future action to redress the damage done
under the old law. Consequently, resources spent defining the initial plaintiff class
would have been wasted even if the claim had not been dismissed as moot.
105. 512 F.2d at 629. Accord, Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); McCleary v. Realty Indus. Inc., 405 F.
Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1975).
106. 554 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1977).
107. Id. at 128.
108. Id. Compare Banks with Stokes v. Bonin, 366 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. La. 1973). In
Stokes the district court, faced with a similar factual setting, allowed the stakeless
plaintiff to continue as class representative: "The cases are legion to the effect that
the fact that [the named plaintiff] personally has been afforded relief neither moots
the claims of the class or disqualifies her from asserting them." 366 F. Supp. at 488.
The legion of cases cited to this effect were brought under Title VII. Permitting the
stakeless plaintiff to continue as representative in such cases may be explained as a
judicial attempt to facilitate the perceived congressional policies underlying that
statute. The validity of this liberal application of rule 23 in Title VII cases has been
placed in doubt by East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977). See text accompanying notes 157 to 169 infra.
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certification. In Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.,10 9 an action under the
securities laws for individual and class damages, plaintiffs' initial motion
for class certification was denied by the district court because it found that
the plaintiffs could not be adequate class representatives while they and the
attorney for the proposed class were members of the same law firm.110 After
securing new counsel, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class
certification. While it was pending, the defendants proffered the plaintiffs
their claimed individual damages. Citing Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings
and Loan Association,"' the district court dismissed the action, holding that
the satisfaction of the named plaintiffs' individual claims deprived it of
12
jurisdiction to decide the motion for class certification.'
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of the
motion for class certification. Distinguishing Winokur on the basis that in it
tender had been made after denial of class certification,"13 the court
concluded that an article III controversy could exist between persons alleged
to be members of an uncertified class and the defendant."1 It cited occasions
on which the interests of persons claimed to be members of a class have
been safeguarded even before a rule 23(c)(1) certification,"15 and pointed out
109. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3688 (U.S.
April 17, 1979) (No. 78-1169).
110. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 72 F.R.D. 187 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). In Winokur, the
Seventh Circuit applied the thesis of the Bradley case, see text accompanying notes 99
to 105 supra, to a tender of damages made after a denial of certification. The district
court dismissed an alleged class action because the defendants had offered to pay to
the named plaintiffs their claimed damages and costs after the court had denied
certification. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the pre-certification
satisfaction of the named plaintiff's individual claim had mooted the case and
deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. at 276. Winokur is noted in 72 Nw.
U.L. REV. 811 (1977).
112. 587 F.2d at 868.
113. Id. at 869. The court noted that unlike the situation in Winokur the
defendants' actions had prevented the district court from even reaching the
certification issue.
114. Id. The court noted that at the time the defendants had offered to pay the
claimed damages, the question of certifying the class "had been freshly raised" and
was thus before the district court. Id. The motion for certification therefore
"sufficiently" though "provisionally" brought the interests of the putative class
members before the court. Id.
115. Id. Several courts have recognized these persons' right to support or oppose
class certification or to challenge the adequacy of representation by the named
plaintiff. See, e.g., Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1968). Others have provided putative class members with notice of a proposed
settlement between the named plaintiff and the defendant before certification. See,
e.g., Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
-See generally Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Pre-CertificationStage:
Is Notice Required?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 303, 317 (1978). As a third instance the court cited
a case in which the Supreme Court had held that the statute of limitations on the
putative class members' individual causes of action is tolled from the date of the filing
of a class action complaint. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 416 U.S. 538 (1974).
For a discussion of this case, see note 245 infra.
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that in footnote eleven of Sosna v.Iowa, 11 the Supreme Court itself had
established that in some situations a class could be certified after the
mooting of the named plaintiffs claims. Recognizing that the footnote
eleven exception had apparently been intended to apply only to "situations
where the nature of the complaint was such that the mere passage of time
would usually make the individual plaintiffs complaint moot before a court
could reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion,"' 117 the court
reasoned that "just as necessity required the development of the relation
back doctrine in cases in which the underlying factual situation naturally
changes so rapidly that the courts cannot keep up, so necessity compels a
similar result here." 118 The court limited its holding to cases in which "a
motion for certification has been pursued with reasonable diligence and is
...pending" when a tender is made. 11 9
The question of the effect of voluntary cessation or tender of damages by
the defendant may also arise after a district court has considered and denied
certification of a class. 20 When this occurs at the trial court level, there
appears to be little dispute that the plaintiff's case must be dismissed for
mootness.' 21 The salient issue in this factual setting is whether a plaintiff
whose claims have been satisfied by the defendant at the trial court level
may appeal a district court's prior denial of class certification. Judicial
reaction to this question has been divergent. One line of reasoning is
typified by the Winokur case, 22 in which the Seventh Circuit found that it
had no jurisdiction to hear a satisfied plaintiffs appeal of the denial of class
23
certification because an article III case or controversy no longer existed.
24
Roper v. Consurve, Inc.,
in which the Fifth Circuit held that a
satisfied plaintiff could continue as class representative and appeal the

denial of class certification, illustrates the contrary reasoning. Two
"BankAmericard" holders brought an action on behalf of all other holders of
the cards in Mississippi, alleging that the issuing bank's interest charges
were usurious. After the district court denied certification of the class, the

116. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
117. 587 F.2d at 870 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id. Although recognizing that the defendant's tender may have raised a
question as to the named plaintiffs ability fairly and adequately to represent the
class, the Susman court "express[ed] no opinion" on that issue, leaving it to the

district court to decide. Id.
120. This was the factual situation in the Winokur case, distinguished by the
Seventh Circuit in Susman.
121. See, e.g., Weisman v. Darneille, 79 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
122. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
123. Though somewhat limited by Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 587 F.2d
866, petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3688 (U.S. April 17, 1979) (No. 78-1169),
Winokur is still binding precedent in the Seventh Circuit when the defendant satisfies
the named plaintiffs claim after a denial of certification by the district court.
124. 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1421 (1979).
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bank - without admitting liability - tendered to the two individual
plaintiffs the maximum they could have recovered had they succeeded on
the merits of their claims. Although the plaintiffs did not accept the
125
payment and objected, the district court entered judgment on their behalf.
The Fifth Circuit first found that it was not deprived of jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, 12 partly supporting this conclusion by pointing to United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 27 and other cases 12 as implicitly establishing

that the article III need for a viable controversy with respect to the
certification determination remained between the defendant and the
putative class members even after the named plaintiffs' claims had been
satisfied; "The only issue is who may raise it.1 ' 29 The court determined that
the plaintiffs could press the appeal because they had objected to the
entering of judgment in their favor and had not accepted the tendered
damages. Moreover, the court held that plaintiffs' act of filing a class action
complaint placed them in a representative capacity, and they had thus
assumed certain responsibilities to the members of the purported class, one
such responsibility being to appeal the denial of class certification.130 Once
having donned the mantle of class representative, the plaintiffs "[could] not
terminate their duties by taking satisfaction," and "a cease-fire [could] not
be pressed upon them by paying their claims."' 13 Permitting the named

125. Id. at 1109.
126. Id. at 1110-11.
127. 432 U.S. 385 (1977). The court read McDonald as holding that any member of
the putative class could intervene at this stage of the case to appeal the denial of
certification. In McDonald, several United Airlines flight attendants brought a class
action challenging the airline's rule that forbade the marriage of female attendants.
Class certification was denied and the trial court entered a final judgment granting
recovery to the named plaintiffs on their individual claims. After learning that the
original plaintiffs did not plan to appeal, Mrs. McDonald, a member of the proposed
class, sought to intervene to seek review of the certification determination. The airline
argued against intervention, contending that because her appeal was sought more
than 30 days after the denial of certification, it was time-barred by rule 4(a) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
30- day time limit for appeals prescribed by that rule was to begin at the entry of the
final judgment and not when certification had been denied. It thus found the motion
to intervene to be "timely" as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The issue whether
article III precluded the appeal was neither pressed by the appellees nor discussed by
the Court.
128. The other cases were Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699 (3rd
Cir. 1977), and Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969), which the court read as supporting the proposition that a successful named
plaintiff could appeal a denial of class certification. See Horn v. Associated Wholesale
Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825
(8th Cir. 1977) (allowing a named plaintiff who loses on the merits to appeal the
certification denial); note 146 infra.
129. 578 F.2d at 1111.
130. Id. at 1110.
131. Id. The court further stated that "even had they been satisfied with the offer
of judgment, the result would not change." Id. at 1111. Judge Thornberry filed a
concurring opinion, objecting to this "sweeping dicta." He would have limited the
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plaintiffs to press the appeal, the court concluded, would not make review of
the district court's certification determination dependent upon intervention
under McDonald by other members of the putative class, persons who might
1 32
be unaware that the named plaintiffs' claims had been satisfied.
The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct and the tender of
individual damages by the defendant before certification may fall within the
doctrine established by the Supreme Court in United States v. W.T. Grant
Co.1 33 In that case the Court held that a defendant may not ordinarily moot
a plaintiffs claim by voluntarily ceasing allegedly unlawful conduct,
reasoning that if a defendant were given the power to moot cases in this
manner, he could "return to his old ways" once judgment was entered on his
behalf. 34 The Court recognized a "public interest in having the legality of
the practices settled ....
,,135 Only when a defendant meets what the Court
as
"a
heavy
burden" to show that its change of heart is
characterized
permanent and that it will not return to its old ways will voluntary cessation
cause the case to be dismissed as moot. 1 36 The application of this doctrine is
particularly compelling in cases involving class allegations. If given free
rein, a defendant could avoid potential liability to thousands of persons by
tendering a relatively small sum of money to the named plaintiff before a
district court had a chance to consider the merits of class certification.
Moreover, the policy goal recognized in Grant of "having the legality of the
practices settled" was expressly ascribed to the class action device by the
Advisory Committee's Note to rule 23. The Committee stated that class
actions were intended to "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated," by
resolving a multiplicity of claims in one lawsuit. 137 Whether employing as

holding to cases in which, as in Roper, the plaintiff had "strenuously objected" to the
defendants' tender. Id. at 1116.
132. Id. at 1111. The court concluded that because all of rule 23's requirements had
been satisfied, the district court had erred-in failing to certify a class. Id. at 1116. The
court also found that the named plaintiffs could continue as class representatives
despite the satisfaction of their claims: "The defendant's decision to confess judgment
has not affected the vigor with which the plaintiffs have pursued the class claims."
Id. at 1112. See Cameron v. E.M. Adams & Co., 547 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1976). In the
Cameron case, upon facts very similar to those in Roper, the court of appeals did not
discuss whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a refusal to certify a class
brought by a named plaintiff whose individual claims had been satisfied. The court
apparently simply assumed that jurisdiction existed. After reversing the denial of
certification, it held that the plaintiff could continue as class representative, because
otherwise, "our remand of the class action might... prove to be a hollow act ....
[T]he class action ... might very well lie moribund for want of a champion." Id. at
478 n.4. The court pointed to no authority for this action.
133. 345 U.S. 629 (1953). The cases in this area have not invoked Grant.
134. Id. at 632.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 633.
137. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966).

HEADLESS CLASS ACTION

1979]

rationale the Susman court's expansive reading of Sosna's footnote
eleven, 3 8 or the Roper court's suggestion that a continuing "representative
capacity" attaches to any person who alleges the existence of a class, 139 the
correct judicial response to a defendant's pre-certification tender or
voluntary cessation is mandated by the "exception" to the mootness
doctrine first articulated in the Grant case.
2.

Successful Invocation of the Judicial Process

Conceptually linked to cases in which the defendant's voluntary actions
satisfy the named plaintiff's claim are those in which the plaintiff prevails
on the merits of his individual claim before a class is certified. This may
occur either as a result of a partial summary judgment for the plaintiff on
his individual cause of action before a trial court reaches the certification
issue or as a result of the plaintiff's prevailing at a trial on the merits after a
denial of class certification.
Illustrative of the former situation is Nelson v. United Credit Plan,
Inc., 14° in which two persons brought a class action seeking a rescission of a
loan transaction on the ground that the lender's disclosure statement did not
satisfy provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 1 41 The plaintiffs moved for
class certification and for summary judgment on the rescission issue.
Continuing the motion for class certification pending completion of
discovery on the issue, the district court granted summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' individual claim. 42 The plaintiffs subsequently sought to renew
the class certification motion, but the court denied it and dismissed the
action. It reasoned that because the plaintiffs had prevailed on their claim,
they no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Their ability
to represent the proposed class adequately was therefore suspect. The court
found particularly compelling that although these plaintiffs stood to gain no
further monetary relief, they would have been required to pay the cost of
43
providing notice had a class been certified.

138. See text accompanying notes 109 to 119 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 124 to 132 supra.
140. 77 F.R.D. 54 (E.D. La. 1978).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1640 (1970).
142. 77 F.R.D. at 56.
143. Id. This was an action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). If the court had
determined that a class action was to be maintained, it would have had to direct the
best notice practicable to all members of the class, including individual notice to those
persons whose names and addresses could have been ascertained through reasonable
effort. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The Supreme Court has allocated the cost of this
notice to the named plaintiff as a part of the expenses of litigation. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Cf. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340 (1978) (defendants may be ordered to assist in identifying the class members
if the cost to them is not "substantial").
Nelson's precedential value is weakened by the alternative grounds for
decision articulated by the court. It indicated that certification was inappropriate for
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An order determining that a plaintiff may not maintain his suit as a
class action leaves his individual claim pending. 144 Should the plaintiff
prevail on the merits of his individual claim, there arises the question
whether he may then appeal the trial court's earlier certification denial. 145
Although some courts have merely asserted that an appeal is or is not
permitted in this circumstance, 146 two opinions addressing the problem
posed suggest three possible solutions.

two reasons other than the satisfaction of the named plaintiffs' claims. 77 F.R.D. at
58. If the court primarily based its denial of certification on the inadequacy of the
plaintiffs' representation, however, the propriety of its management of the case is
highly questionable. The plaintiffs only became "inadequate" because the court
granted their motion for summary judgment on the individual liability issue while
delaying a decision on certification. The chronology of the court's actions may have

saved the defendant from class-wide liability. To avoid granting this potential
immunity, a district court should rule on a motion to certify a class either before or
concurrent with its determination of the merits of the case.
Compare Nelson with Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). In Frost a widow of a deceased insured claimed that the

Social Security Administration had deprived her of benefits without a full evidentiary
hearing. She purported to represent a class of "all persons who now or may in the
future be entitled to survivors benefits under the Act whose benefits have been or may
be reduced without a prior hearing." Id. at 61. Before it reached the certification issue,
the district court, with the defendant's consent, ordered the Secretary of Health,
Education & Welfare to conduct a full hearing on the plaintiffs claim. In rejecting an
argument by the defendant that the case thus became moot before the district court

certified a class, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit stated:
The reason for generally requiring that the controversy be "live" as to the
named plaintiff at the time of the class action designation is that otherwise
the court would have no assurance that the named plaintiff will vigorously
represent the class. This has little application when, as here, the court has
deferred class action determination, with the agreement of all parties, pending
a ruling on the merits. The Government has pointed to no respect in which
this case would have proceeded differently if the court had certified this as a
class action [before granting the hearing].
Id. at 64. Because the defendants had agreed to the delay in the certification
determination, the court apparently considered them precluded by estoppel from later
raising the mootness claim. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4,
§ 1785, at 133.
144. Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968).
145. There appears to be no question that a plaintiff who loses on his individual
claim may join with his appeal of that issue an appeal of the propriety of the class
certification denial. In Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), for
example, Judge Rubin stated: "An individual plaintiff who loses on the merits may
also appeal a denial of certification." Id. at 1110. The cases he cited in support of this
proposition apparently assumed that such an appeal was proper and contained no
discussion of the issue. See, e.g., Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d
270, 276-77 (10th Cir. 1977); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 831 n.5 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977).
146. In Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 1421 (1979), for example, attempting to bolster his view that a person who alleges
the existence of a class in his complaint has a duty to appeal a denial of certification,
Judge Rubin, writing for the majority, asserted, "An individual plaintiff who has

1979]

HEADLESS CLASS ACTION

The Fifth Circuit in McLaughlin v. Hoffman, 147 holding it had
jurisdiction to hear the individually successful plaintiffs appeal of the
already prevailed in the trial court may appeal the denial of class certification," td. at
1110, and cited Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977), and
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). A close
examination of those cases reveals that they provide inadequate precedent for Judge
Rubin's conclusion. In Esplin the district court refused to certify a class but found for
the plaintiff on the merits of all but one of his individual claims. The defendants
appealed from the judgment against them, and the plaintiff cross-appealed both from
the refusal to certify a class and from the trial court's finding that one of his claims
was barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the plaintiff had a personal interest in
pressing the appeal. Id. at 95-97, 102. The case is therefore factually distinct from
those in which the plaintiff is completely satisfied with the trial court's determination
of his individual claims.
Gelman also fails to provide support for Judge Rubin's assertion. There, the
plaintiff sought an interlocutory appeal of the district court's refusal to certify the
class. After denying the appeal, the court of appeals explained that its decision would
not preclude review of the district court's actions: "Implicit in our reasoning, of course,
is the assumption that an individual plaintiff such as Gelman who prevails in the
district court will have standing to appeal from the denial of class action treatment as
a representative of the potential class." 556 F.2d at 701. To support its "assumption,"
the court asserted that "Esplin v. Hirschi ... involved such an action." Id. at 702.
This reliance on Esplin was misplaced because, as discussed above, the plaintiff there
had not completely "prevailed" in the district court. The Gelman court also cited
Share v. Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923
(1977), which also addressed the propriety of an interlocutory appeal of a denial of
class certification. As had the Gelman court, the court in Share rationalized its refusal
to hear the interlocutory appeal by positing that review of the district court's action
would ultimately be possible. Implicit in its statement that "[i]t is simply not true, as
plaintiffs here claim, that the successful plaintiff in an individual action would have
no incentive to challenge a denial of class status," id. at 283, is the premise that such
an incentive could be acted upon. The court pointed to Esplin as precedent for such a
challenge.
To counter an argument based on these unsupported assertions that a
plaintiff who prevails on his individual claim may appeal a denial of class
certification, one can cite several equally unsupported judicial declarations to the
opposite effect. In Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976), Judges Swygert and Bauer, arguing for the adoption of
the "death knell" doctrine as an avenue for the interlocutory appeal of the denial of
class certification, warned that "a denial of immediate appeal may represent, for the
absent class members, a denial of the very right to be represented. A named plaintiff
may not seek to appeal the class determination order after he has gotten a favorable
verdict." Id. at 1371 (Swygert & Bauer, JJ., dissenting). They cited as support for their
prophecy Judge Hays' dissent in City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics
Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969). Judge Hays had also urged the adoption of the
"death knell" doctrine, admonishing that otherwise the district court's refusal to
certify the class would be immune to judicial review, the successful plaintiff having no
reason to appeal the adverse class action determination. Id. at 300 (Hays, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hays did not indicate whether he believed it would be proper for
such a plaintiff to appeal, should he have the inclination to do so. It appears that
Judges Swygert and Bauer read Judge Hays' observation about what a plaintiff
probably would not do as a comment on what that person, in fact, could not do.
147. 547 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1977). McLaughlin involved a Title VII class action filed
by a black employee of the General Services Administration who had been denied a
promotion. He alleged discrimination both against himself and against a class of all

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

denial of class certification, found the live controversy requirement satisfied
because plaintiff stood to benefit from class-wide injunctive relief ordering
his employer to end discrimination. The reasoning employed in McLaughlin
suggests that any time a plaintiff stands to benefit, perhaps even
indirectly, 148 from the awarding of class-wide relief, he can appeal a denial
of class certification despite the satisfaction of his individual claims. 1 49 This
proposition comfortably applies to cases involving challenges to employment practices, welfare benefit allocation, housing regulations, or voting law
provisions. Indeed, it could be argued that a satisfied plaintiff may always
stand to benefit from the certification of a class. Should a class be certified
and ultimately prevail, the attorneys' fees will be satisfied from the class
award. Consequently, a much smaller portion would be paid by the plaintiff
than had the fees been provided solely from his individual share.lw0
Chief Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit, concurring in Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 1 51 suggested two additional arguments for
allowing appeal by the individually successful plaintiff. The first, based on

"past, present, and future black and Latin American employees." Id. at 919. The
district court awarded him back pay, attorneys' fees, expenses, and injunctive relief
but refused to certify the class.
148. Although the McLaughlin court did say plaintiff stood to benefit "directly"
from a class-wide injunction, id. at 921, the distinction is an elusive one. McLaughlin
won an injunction giving him the promotion he sought. Presumably he would benefit
from a class-wide injunction against discrimination when it came time for another
promotion. That benefit, however, is no less speculative and remote than the
satisfaction a completely successful named plaintiff might feel knowing his coworkers enjoy a similar relief from discrimination, a benefit the McLaughlin court
would likely have called indirect.
149. See also Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir.
1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 161 & 162 infra.
150. See, e.g., Share v. Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1977), in which the court, in explaining its view that a named
plaintiff who had prevailed on his individual claim would have an incentive to appeal
a denial of class certification, said: "Presumably, a reversal of the denial would lead
to a greater recovery and hence lower the proportion of plaintiffs individual recovery
going to his attorney." Id. at 283.
151. 559 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978). In Gardner, a woman
who had applied for employment at a radio station and been rejected brought a Title
VII action to obtain injunctive relief for herself and a class of other females. Upon
denial of her motion to certify a class, she sought immediate review by the court of
appeals. She argued that because the denial of certification had effectively limited the
scope of potential injunctive relief, the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear her
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970), which permits immediate appeal of
interlocutory orders refusing injunctions. The court, however, dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, explaining that the district court's refusal to certify a class would
not permanently foreclose the granting of class-wide injunctive relief because the
certification determination would always be reviewable by an appellate court after
judgment had been entered. The majority's analysis of the issue rested upon an
assumption that the class certification determination could be appealed by the named
plaintiff whether or not she subsequently prevailed on her individual claim. Id. at 212.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Seitz agreed that the refusal to certify the class could
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an expansive reading of the Sosna footnote eleven, was that article III did
not necessarily dictate that a live interest exist for the duration of a lawsuit.
Although the "relation back" theory of the footnote was applied there only
to "capable of repetition, yet evading review" cases, 5 2 it was only a legal
fiction devised to fulfill the continuing controversy requirement. 5 3 If the
requirement could be met by the use of a legal fiction, it was not a
constitutional requirement but rather a consideration in the discretionary
decision whether to reach the merits of the case. Such discretion ought to be
exercised in favor of allowing an appeal because not doing so would insulate
from review a "decision of far reaching consequence" and might frustrate
interests of judicial economy by encouraging "a multiplicity of lawsuits in
conditions where a class action would be the preferable mode of adjudica54
tion."1
Alternatively, Judge Seitz suggested that the plaintiff be allowed to
appeal because he had a continuing personal interest in exercising his
fiduciary responsibility to the class. This fiduciary responsibility attaches
not upon certification but upon the filing of a class action,'55 and permits

be appealed by the plaintiff should she be granted individual relief, but thought the
issue "deserve[d] greater explication than the majority ha[d] given it." Id. at 214.
The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that "the order denying class
certification in this case did not have any.. . irreparable effect. It could be reviewed
both prior to and after final judgment." Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978). In a footnote appended to this statement, id. at 480 n.6, the
Court quoted FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1): "[a]n order [determining the certifiability of a
class] may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits .... The Court apparently envisioned a 23(c)(1) motion by the plaintiff to
alter or amend the denial of certification as providing an avenue for pre-judgment
review. As to the availability of review after a final judgment had been entered, the
Court cited United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). For a discussion of
McDonald, see note 127 supra. Because only McDonald was cited, it is likely that the
Court considered appeal solely through post-judgment intervention by the putative

class members and did not entertain any notions about the propriety of a satisfied
plaintiff pressing the appeal.
152. It has, however, been applied to other types of cases. E.g., Geraghty v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert granted,99 S.Ct. 1420 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 77 to 98 supra. Courts have extended the use of the

"relation back" fiction to cases in which the district court had unduly delayed its

decision on certification, Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum), and to
cases in which the named plaintiffs were granted their individual relief before the

district court could rule on class certification, Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).

153. Judge Seitz pointed out that in those cases in which the Supreme Court had
employed the "relation back" doctrine, once stripped of the legal fiction, there was, in
fact, an interval when no live controversy existed. As an example, Judge Seitz pointed
to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975), in which all of the named plaintiffs
had been released from the challenged detention before the class was certified. See
text accompanying notes 42 to 44 supra.
154. 559 F.2d at 218 (footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 219. As "indicia" that such a fiduciary responsibility attaches upon the
filing of a complaint with class allegations, Judge Seitz pointed to three facts: first,

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

class representatives to "raise matters bearing on the interests of class
members even though they have no tangible personal interests in these
56
matters."1
Judge Seitz's opinion, like those of the Susman and Roper courts,
presents a sensible approach to the pre-certification satisfaction of the
named plaintiff's claim. Where there are other compelling values at stake, as
is the case when a district court's denial of certification may be insulated
from review or when a defendant may protect himself from class-wide
liability by satisfying the named plaintiff, the requirements of article III
should be read flexibly. The Susman and Roper opinions, and Judge Seitz's
concurring opinion in Gardner, protect these values either by reading
Sosna's footnote eleven as a broad mandate to create legal fictions where
necessary, or by preserving the plaintiff's "stake" in the case by ascribing to
him a continuing fiduciary duty to the class. These approaches to the
problem of the headless class action have emerged from what might be
called "easy" cases, those in which the plaintiff loses his stake through no
fault of his own, the actions of the court or defendant making creative
jurisprudence particularly attractive. Ironically, the remedial procedure this
Comment proposes was suggested by the much more difficult case in which
the named plaintiffs claim is found to be meritless.

even before a class is certified, courts have held that there may be no settlement or
dismissal without judicial approval, e.g., Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Burgener v. California Adult Auth., 407 F.
Supp. 555, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1976); second, before a court certifies a class it must
scrutinize the aspiring representative to assure that he will "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class," FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); and third, under rule
23(d)(2), a court has the power to issue orders to protect the putative class members
even before certification, id. 23(d)(2).
156. 559 F.2d at 219. Other courts have held that a person who brings an action on
behalf of a class assumes fiduciary responsibility. In Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298
(4th Cir. 1978), for example, a case that mandated pre-certification notice of
settlements to putative class members in certain situations, the Fourth Circuit stated:
By asserting a representative role on behalf of the alleged class, these
appellees voluntarily accepted a fiduciary obligation towards members of the
putative class they thus have undertaken to represent. They may not abandon
the fiduciary role they assumed at will or by agreement with the appellant, if
prejudice to the members of the class they claimed to represent would result or
if they improperly used the class action procedure for their personal
aggrandizement.
Id. at 1305 (footnotes omitted). See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S. Ct. 1421 (1979) ("By the very act of filing a class action,
the class representatives assume responsibility to members of the class."); cf. Girsh v.
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) ("district court [has a] fiduciary responsibility
as the guardian of the rights of the absentee class members.). See generally 2 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 9, § 2700.
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The Named Plaintiff Has a Meritless Claim

A plaintiff may lose his personal stake in the outcome of a case because
he is shown never to have suffered any legally cognizable injury. 157 The
absence of merit to the named plaintiff's claim may be disclosed either
before a district court has an opportunity to rule on class certification or as a
result of a trial on the merits of the named plaintiffs individual claims after
the district court has properly or improperly denied a motion for certification. At whatever point the invalidity of the claim becomes apparent, the
judicial reaction has been inconsistent, the courts having reached three
distinct results. Several have permitted the action to continue with the
stakeless plaintiff continuing at the helm, several have dismissed the action
entirely, and at least one has taken "a middle ground," permitting the action
to continue until a new class representative with a stake in the case appears.
Several courts have allowed actions brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 58 to continue past the demise of the named plaintiff's claim with
the stakeless plaintiff being retained as class representative. In Moss v.
Lane Co., 1 9 for example, the district court dismissed the named plaintiffs
individual claim on the ground that he could not show that he had been
personally discriminated against and subsequently refused to certify the
class. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs
individual claim but reversed the refusal to certify, remanding the case to
the district court to continue the action with the stakeless plaintiff as class
representative. It reasoned:
If the plaintiff were a member of the class at the commencement of the
action and his competency as a representative of the class [were] then
determined or assumed, the subsequent dismissal or mootness of his
individual claim, particularly in a discrimination case, will not operate
as a dismissal or render moot the action of the class, or destroy
the
16°
plaintiffs right to litigate the issues on behalf of the class.

157. E.g., East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). For
a discussion of Rodriguez, see text accompanying notes 45 to 53 supra.
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). See generally Jonofsky, Class Actions
Under Title VII, 27 LABOR L.J. 323 (1976).
159. 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973), noted in 11 Hous. L. REV. 732 (1974).
160. 471 F.2d at 855. Accord, Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Huff v. N.D.
Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The standard for determining whether a
plaintiff may maintain a class action is not whether he will ultimately prevail on his
claim"). The rationale operating in Moss can be traced to Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), another suit challenging
discriminatory action, in which the named plaintiff was permitted to represent the
employees of a firm although he was not able to prove that he had been discriminated
against. The Johnson court determined that the plaintiff could serve as representative
of the class despite his claim's being meritless, if his attorney was "qualified,
experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation," id. at 1125, if he was not
involved in a collusive suit, and if he did not have interests antagonistic to those of
the class. The court was apparently satisfied that the plaintiffs claims - albeit
meritless - were typical. Noticeable by its absence from this catalog of desired
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Reaching the same result as Moss but articulating a different rationale is
Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.161 There, the Tenth Circuit

permitted a Title VII plaintiff with a meritless claim to continue to act as
class representative because, as an employee, he had "a present, past and
future interest" in eliminating discrimination by his employer. 6 2 Moss and
Horn can be explained as efforts to encourage the use of the class action
63
device in Title VII litigation.
Such a permissive reading of rule 23 in Title VII actions may now be
proscribed by the Supreme Court's language in East Texas Motor Freight
6
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez.1
4 After acknowledging that such suits are often
by their very nature class actions, the Court stated:
[C]areful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23
remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint
alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the
party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative
of
165
those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.
qualities in a class representative is the one emphasized most strongly by many
courts, the assurance that the representative would vigorously prosecute the class
claims. The list of requirements for adequate representation adopted by most courts is
set out in note 23 supra.
161. 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977). In Horn, a black employee brought a Title VII
class action against his employer, alleging racial discrimination in job promotions

and employment conditions. The district court failed to rule on class certification and,
after a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs individual claim, entered judgment for the

defendant. While noting that from the facts developed at trial it could be inferred that
the employer had discriminated against black persons generally, the district court
found that certification would be improper due to "plaintiffs lack of standing
resulting from his failure to prove his own case of discrimintion." Id. at 273. The court
of appeals, after affirming the dismissal of the named plaintiffs individual claim,
reversed the denial of class treatment and ordered the court to grant class-wide relief.
It reached this conclusion by finding that the district court had erred in delaying its
decision on certification until after a trial on the merits and that certification was
proper even after trial.
162. Id. at 277. See also McLaughlin v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1977),
discussed at text accompanying notes 147 to 149 supra.
163. Professor Wright has recognized this trend to apply rule 23 liberally in Title
VII and other civil rights litigation and devotes a section of his discussion of class
actions to it. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1771. See generally Note,
Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The
Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979). The rationale for liberal
application of rule 23 in civil rights actions was explained in Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), another case permitting a plaintiff without a live
claim to represent a class. Pointing out that enforcement of Title VII was
intentionally left by Congress to individual plaintiffs, who, in effect, would become
"'private Attorney[s] General,"' id. at 33 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Ent., Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)), the court concluded: "The suit is therefore more than a
private claim by the employee seeking the particular job which is at the bottom of the
charge of unlawful discrimination ....
[Tihat individual, often obscure, takes on the
mantel of the sovereign," id. at 32.
164. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). See text accompanying notes 45 to 53 supra.
165. 431 U.S. at 405-06.
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Although judicial and scholarly interpretations of Rodriguez have been
inconsistent, 166 several courts have read the case as proscribing a liberal
application of rule 23(a) in Title VII actions. In Shipp v. Memphis Area
Office, Tennessee Department of Employment Security,16 7 a black man
brought a class action, alleging that the Tennessee Department of
Employment Security (TDES) had violated Title VII by engaging in racial
discrimination in its job referral services. The district court delayed a
certification determination until after the trial of the plaintiffs individual
claim. Finding that plaintiff's claims lacked merit, it dismissed his cause of
action. The district court then decided against the yet uncertified class on
the merits. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Shipp's individual
claim but reversed the determination against the "class." The trial on the
merits had revealed Shipp as an improper class representative:
[I]t is abundantly clear that plaintiff never was an employee of TDES
and in fact never had applied for a job at TDES. We, therefore, fail to see
how it can be said that plaintiffs claims are typical of the class of TDES
employees who were, are, or will be discriminated against because of the
internal hiring and promotion practices of the Department of Personnel. 168
Based upon Rodriguez, the court concluded that this finding precluded the
continuation of the action. 6 9 The district court should have dismissed
166. Compare Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1977) and Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 25 FED. R. SERV. 2d 189 (D. Md. 1978) and
Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 516 (N.D. fll. 1977) and Carpenter v. Herschede Hall
Clock Div., Arnold Indus., 77 F.R.D. 700 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (reading Rodriguez to
prescribe a strict application of rule 23 (a) to Title VII class actions) with Alexander v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977) and Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 17 FAIR EMPL PRAC. CASE 195 (N.D. Tex. 1978) and Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977) and Adams v. Jefferson Davis Parish
School Bd., 76 F.R.D. 621 (W.D. La. 1977) (finding that Rodriguez does not preclude a
liberal application of rule 23(a) to Title VII class actions).

One student author has argued that Rodriguez does not sound the "death knell"
of a liberal application of rule 23 in Title VII cases, but should be read as a "response

to an unusual set of facts." Comment, The ProperScope of Representationin Title VII
Class Actions, supra note 53, at 176. Another agrees, concluding that "[t]he conflict

between the permissive and the rigorous approaches to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites

was not settled by the Supreme Court's treatment of 23(a) in Rodriguez." Note,
Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The
Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), supra note 163, at 882. Several other responses in
legal literature to Rodriguez have, however, reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g.,
Younger & McElligott, Defending the Employer in Title VII Litigation, IV VA. BAR
ASS'N J. 4, 6-7 (1978); Fourth Circuit Review, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 528-29
(1978).

167. 581 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1788 (1979).
168. Id. at 1172.
169. Id. A similar result was reached in Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918

(8th Cir. 1977), also a Title VII class action. Without either conducting an evidentiary
hearing or giving notice to the parties, the district court found that certification of a

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

39

without prejudice to the putative class members, rather than deciding on the
merits against them.
Satterwhite v. City of Greenville70° illustrates the difficulty courts have
had in determining the effect of the named plaintiffs claims being found
meritless before certification, and its various opinions reflect the spectrum of
judicial viewpoints on the problem. Mrs. Satterwhite, an unsuccessful
applicant for a position with the City of Greenville, Texas, filed a Title VII
class action on behalf of all present and prospective female employees of the
city allegedly victimized by sexual discrimination in hiring, job classification, and compensation. 17 1 Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the
district court denied a motion to certify the class but permitted the plaintiff
to press her individual claim. It refused to certify the class because Mrs.
Satterwhite's claim was not typical; her application had been rejected for a
peculiar reason. 172 The court found after trial that the rejection of the
plaintiff's employment application was not discriminatorily motivated and
entered judgment for the defendant. 173 Affirming the dismissal of the
plaintiffs individual claim, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of class certification because the
district court had erred in allowing the city's defense to the individual claim
to affect the decision whether Mrs. Satterwhite was an adequate class
representative. 174 Citing Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 175 the court found that the
plaintiff met the requirements of rule 23 and could continue as representative should the district court certify a class and find her to be qualified after
76
a proper evidentiary hearing.
The City of Greenville successfully petitioned for a rehearing, contending that because a class had not yet come into existence and because the
class would be improper. After a trial on the merits of the plaintiff's individual claim,
the court found that he had not been discriminated against and entered judgment for
the defendant. Although noting that the district court had erred in ruling on
certification without having conducted an evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals
affirmed. It reasoned that because the plaintiff had not suffered any discrimination
he was not a member of the class he purported to represent, and therefore, under
Rodriguez, could not be an adequate representative. Id. at 922.
170. 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008).
171. 395 F. Supp. 698, 699- 700 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 549 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), vacated on
rehearing,557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008).
172. Id. at 701. Mrs. Satterwhite had applied for the job of manager of the
municipal airport. Her husband was a prime tenant of the airport. The city refused to
hire her, it claimed, solely because of a prohibition against such "conflicts of interest"
in the city charter. Id. at 700.
173. Id. at 701.
174. 549 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir.), vacated on rehearing,557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008).
175. 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973). Huff is the Fifth Circuit's analogue to the Moss
case, discussed in text accompanying notes 159 & 160 supra.
176. 549 F.2d at 348.
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named plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of the case,
there was no case or controversy and thus no jurisdictional basis for the
court of appeals to consider the action further. 177 The second panel withdrew
the part of the earlier opinion that dealt with the class because the first
panel had not considered the case or controversy issue. 178 Citing Sosna v.
Iowa179 and Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo.,180 it concluded that had

the district court certified a class before it became apparent that the
plaintiffs claim lacked merit, "there [would have] existed a legal entity
apart from her which possibly could have maintained a personal stake in
the controversy,"' 8'1 and hence that article III would have been satisfied. It
then held that the action could go on, apparently reading Sosna and Franks
to permit the continuation of not only actions in which the class had been
certified before the demise of the named plaintiffs claim, but also those in
which a class would have been certified before the loss of the plaintiffs
stake but for judicial error. 8 2 Unlike the first panel, however, it did not
decide the issue whether the stakeless plaintiff could continue to serve as
class representative. Rather, the court remanded the case to the district court
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine: (1) if the original denial of
certification was improper under the circumstances existing at that time; (2)
if so, whether the certified class retained upon the dismissal of the named
plaintiff a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to serve in its own
right as an article III plaintiff; and (3) whether the stakeless plaintiff could
continue as class representative under Huff.5 3
Judge Gee, who had concurred in the first panel decision, was
"prompted to further thought" and dissented.18 4 He argued that the remand,
permitting a plaintiff shown to have no interest in the relief sought by the
class to argue the existence of the class and the propriety of her

177. 557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008). The first
panel had not discussed the article III issue.
178. Id. at 423. The court adhered to the first panel's dismissal of the individual
claim. Id. at 416 n.2.
179. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Sosna is discussed in text accompanying notes 26 to 39
supra.
180. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
181. 557 F.2d at 422.
182. The error in the case was the district court's failure to explore the class claims
before denying Mrs. Satterwhite the right to continue pursuing them: "In view of the
trial court's supervisory responsibilities under Rule 23 as well as the almost
presumptively class based nature of Title VII suits, we hold that some evidentiary
exploration of the issues was required prior to the court's [pre-trial] ruling." Id. at 420.
183. Id. at 423. The second panel did not find that the validity of Huff had been
placed in question by Rodriguez: "[W]e conclude that Rodriguez's reliance upon the
named plaintiffs loss on the merits does not apply to a situation where an
appropriate certification would have preceded the individual plaintiffs loss on the
merits." Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 424.
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representation of it "countenances a contravention of Article III."185 The
district court would have no jurisdiction to hear the reargument because the
stakeless plaintiff could no longer allege proper standing. Judge Gee
concluded that because certification represented the birthdate of the class as
a jurisprudential entity, "the district court's denial of certification, whether
correct or not, means that no class is present to carry the case .. ,186
".. He
would have affirmed the district court's dismissal of the named plaintiffs
claims and expressed disapproval in dictum of that court's undue emphasis
on the probability of the plaintiffs individual success in its determination of
87
whether to certify the class.1
After a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated the second panel's
opinion except the portion affirming the district court's dismissal of the
named plaintiffs individual claim.188 It reached this result not because it
agreed with Judge Gee's contention that article III precluded continuation of
the case, but because it concluded that under Rodriguez, once Mrs.
Satterwhite's claim was shown to be meritless, she was not an adequate
representative, and that therefore the class could not be certified. 189 The
court found it clear that Mrs. Satterwhite "is not at present a member of the
class [of discriminatees], and . . .she was not a member even at the time
that suit was filed.. . ."10 It distinguished Sosna v. Iowa' 9 ' by pointing out

that in that case the plaintiff had suffered the same injury as the members
of the class but had lost her stake in the case due to the passage of time. 92

185. Id.
186. Id. at 425.
187. Id. Judge Gee characterized "the majority's opinion allowing [Mrs. Satterwhite] to continue with class proceedings [as] a concession to the notion that a class

suit belongs to no one so much as the plaintiffs lawyer." Id. at 426.
188. 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008).
189. Id. at 991. On the article III issue, the court stated: "Because, under these
circumstances, the class action cannot meet the requirements of Rule 23 ... we need
not reach the issue whether plaintiff has the requisite standing to sue under Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution." Id. Judge Godbold, who had written the second
panel opinion, dissented, chastising the majority for skirting the article III issue, "the
issue on which the panel divided in its second opinion." Id. at 999.
190. Id. at 992. The court was, however, careful to say that it was not simply the
lack of merit in Mrs. Satterwhite's claim, but the lack of a "nexus" with the class, that
made her an inadequate representative. Id. This "nexus" doctrine serves to reconcile
Huff and Rodriguez. Id. at 993 n.8. Sometimes a lack of merit destroys the "nexus,"
sometimes it does not. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
191. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
192. 578 F.2d at 992. Sosna was also distinguished on the issue of certification:
The putative class here was never certified and the class claims were never
tried. Where a class is certified, and class claims tried, before the lack of merit
or mootness of the representative's claim is discovered, the class representative has already assiduously asserted the claims of the constituents. The
conservation of both litigants' and judicial resources makes it desirable not
only to avoid abortion of the litigation but also to prevent prejudice to the
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Mrs. Satterwhite, however, had never suffered any legally cognizable injury,
either individually or in common with the class. The court also found
significant that Mrs. Satterwhite had not sought an evidentiary hearing on
1 93
the issue of class certification.
In response to the plaintiff's argument that, as the second panel had
recognized, the district court denied certification at a time when it could not
have realized that her claim was meritless, the court stated that it would not
engage in "academic error-correcting."' 194 It found, rather, that the issue of
adequate representation would be decided "'on the full record, including the
facts developed at the trial of the plaintiffs individual claims.' "195 And
although the en banc court agreed with the second panel that exposure of
the lack of merit of the named plaintiff's claim should not moot the class
claims in cases in which, but for judicial error, certification would have
occurred while the named plaintiffs claim was still valid, it added that the
failure to certify must occur "through no fault of the plaintiff."' 96 The court
found Mrs. Satterwhite's failure to move for an evidentiary hearing on the
97
certification issue to constitute such "fault.'
Characterizing its holding as "very narrow," the court left the door open
for the continuation of actions in which, "after an appropriate certification
hearing, the court, through no fault of the plaintiff, improperly denies
certification and the plaintiff subsequently loses on the merits of his
individual claim."' 98 In a footnote, it stated the reasons for allowing a case

numbers of a certified class who, in the midst of a law suit, suddenly discover
that their representative's claim is no longer viable.
Id. at 994.

193. See 578 F.2d at 993, 995 n.10, 998. The court would not distinguish Rodriguez
on the ground that in that case the plaintiffs had not moved for certification:
"Whatever plausibility this suggestion might have if the plaintiff had been the victim
of judicial error beyond her control, the plaintiff herself failed even to seek an
evidentiary hearing, or to make any offer of proof as to the appropriateness of a class
action." Id. at 993.
194. Id. at 993.
195. Id. (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406
n.12 (1977)).

196. Id. at 995.
197. Id. In his dissent, Judge Godbold disputed the attribution of fault for the
absence of a proper certification determination to Mrs. Satterwhite. She had filed
interrogatories and, upon the city's refusal to respond, had moved to compel answers.
She had also requested a hearing on this issue: "[P]laintiff might reasonably infer
that since she had pending one motion for a hearing she need not ask for two
hearings." Id. at 1001 n.6. Moreover, Judge Godbold argued that Rodriguez should be
distinguished because, unlike the plaintiffs in that case, Mrs. Satterwhite had made a
timely motion for certification. Id. at 1001. But see id. at 993.
198. Id. at 995. The en banc court also distinguished cases falling directly within
Sosna's footnote eleven, id., and cases such as Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th
Cir. 1973), in which the district court had dismissed class claims because of a lack of
merit to the named plaintiff's individual claims without considering whether,
notwithstanding the lack of merit, a sufficient "nexus" remained, 578 F.2d at 996.
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to continue in that situation: the hearing would provide a full record on
which an appellate court could appropriately base its review of the
certification decision; in those cases, the error of the district court would be
the sole cause of the failure of the class to be certified; and unless the case
could continue, the district court's error would go unreviewed. 199
The Satterwhite en banc decision is distinct from the second panel
opinion in two respects. First, the full court read Rodriguez as mandating
that the adequacy of a stakeless plaintiffs representation be determined on
the basis of the facts known at the time of appeal, not only those facts of
which the district court was cognizant when it denied certification. Second,
although agreeing that a purported class action could continue when the
absence of certification was due to judicial error, the court added the
requirement that the denial of certification must have come through no fault
of the plaintiff. It agreed with the second panel, however, that Rodriguez
should not be read as precluding in all cases the representation of a class by
a named plaintiff whose claim had been proven meritless." The Satterwhite
en banc decision is best read as a response to a peculiar set of facts, and, as
the court itself pointed out, should be characterized as "very narrow." 2 1
In Goodman v. Schlesinger,2° 2 the Fourth Circuit employed a novel
procedural device to reach "a middle ground" between those courts that
dismiss the entire action when the named plaintiffs individual claim is
shown to be meritless and those that permit the action to continue with the
stakeless plaintiff as class representative. Three employees of the Department of the Navy brought a Title VII class action alleging racial and sexual
discrimination in hiring, promotion, and conditions of employment. The
district court granted the government's motion to deny certification of the
class solely upon its consideration of the allegations in the complaint. After
the plaintiffs' individual claims were tried on the merits, the court found for
23
the defendants and dismissed the action. 0
199. 578 F.2d at 995 n.10. On the issue of review, see text accompanying notes 235
to 242 infra.
200. 578 F.2d at 993 n.8. In Camper v. Calumet Petrochemicals, Inc., 584 F.2d 70,
72 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), a Fifth Circuit panel construed Satterwhite as
establishing "that an adjudicated lack of merit of the individual claim is a proper
factor in determining whether" a stakeless plaintiff should continue as class
representative. See Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 590 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (named plaintiff whose individual claim is found to be meritless who does not
appeal that determination cannot appeal refusal to certify a class, citing Rodriquez
and Satterwhite); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Satterwhite as
support for permitting a plaintiff whose individual claims had been "finally
adjudicated and dismissed" before certification to continue to represent a certified
class).
201. Indeed, one day after the full Fifth Circuit announced the Satterwhite
decision, one of its panels decided a case in which it permitted a stakeless plaintiff to
continue as class representative in order to appeal a denial of class certification by the
district court. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 1421 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 124 to 132 supra.
202. 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978).
203. Id. at 1326-27.
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The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the named plaintiffs'
individual claims, but because it found that the district court had erred in
ruling on certification without any evidence in the record, it vacated the part
of the lower court's decision that concerned the class. The court then
determined that the three original plaintiffs could not continue to represent
the class: "[Slhould there be any revival of the class action following
remand, the plaintiffs may not participate. They have had their day in
2 4

court."

Having concluded that the original named plaintiffs had no further part
to play in the case, but finding it appropriate to remand the "class
action,"' 2 5 the court was faced with what Judge Gee in his dissent to the
second Satterwhite panel opinion had described as "a potential lawsuit
searching for a sponsor."'' 2 6 To escape this dilemma, the court remanded the
case with instructions that it be retained on the docket for a reasonable time
to permit a plaintiff in a similar position to prosecute the case as class
representative. It added:
If such a plaintiff so comes forward, the court should then, on the whole
record before it, . . . decide whether a class action is maintainable and
whether the then named plaintiff should represent the class. . . If no
representative plaintiff so comes forward within a reasonable time, then
the district court should strike the class action from the calendar and
2 7
enter a final dismissal thereof. 1
As support for the propriety of this remand, the court relied upon its own
earlier decision in Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 218 and the Supreme Court's
citation of that case "with apparent approval" 2 9 in East Texas Motor
Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez.210 In Cox, a black employee brought a
Title VII discrimination suit against his employer, seeking individual and
class relief. After a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs individual claim, the
district court found that because the plaintiff had not been discriminated
against personally, he could not serve as representative and that therefore
the class could not be certified. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff's individual claim, but, finding that the district court had

204. Id. at 1331. To support this conclusion, the court rather cryptically cited Huff
v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), and Moss v. Lane Co., 471
F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973). As discussed above, these decisions are the progenitors of a
line of cases that do permit persons who have "had their day in court" to continue as
class representatives. See text accompanying notes 158 to 165 supra.
205. Because no class had yet been certified, this was a misappellation.
206. 557 F.2d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 1977) (Gee, J., dissenting), vacated, 578 F.2d 987
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979)
(No. 78-1008).
207. 584 F.2d at 1332-33.
208. 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
209. 584 F.2d at 1333.
210. Id. (citing 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977)). See note 214 infra.
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erred in delaying the certification determination until after the trial,
remanded the "class action" to the district court to be "retained" should a
new representative present himself within a reasonable period of time.21 ' It
cited no precedent for its actions. 212 The Goodman court recognized that the
procedure employed in Cox represented a solution of the problem inconsistent with the decisions of other circuits and that "some of the language in
[Rodriguez] may seem to indicate that we should simply affirm the dismissal
of the class action ....
,,213 However, because the Supreme Court in
Rodriguez had cited Cox with what the Goodman court read as approval, it
214
adhered to its precedent.

211. 471 F.2d at 16. The court suggested that the district court's failure to make an
'interim determination" as to certification may have been error. Id. at 15. It was
moved to choose the peculiar remedy it did, however, more out of solicitude for the
defendant, who apparently had changed his evil ways, than out of a desire to correct
error. After noting plaintiffs argument that rule 23 contemplated an early
determination of maintainability as a class action, the court said it was bound on
appeal by the district court's finding against the plaintiff on his individual claims.
Apparently the court was impressed with the argument that the trial had made the
maintainability issue academic, and would have affirmed the dismissal of the class
claims but for the fact that such a dismissal would have had no res judicata effect; the
repentant defendant would not be protected from future class actions. The class
claims apparently were remanded in the hope that once properly raised they could be
permanently buried. See id. at 16.
212. Id. The court did mention that this resolution of the case had been
recommended by plaintiffs counsel.
213. 584 F.2d at 1333.
214. Id. The Supreme Court cited Cox in Rodriguez in an explanation of the proper
result in a case in which the named plaintiff's claim is found to be meritless before
certification:
Where no class has been certified, .. and the class claims remain to be tried,
the decision whether the named plaintiffs should represent a class is
appropriately made on the full record, including the facts developed at the
trial of the plaintiffs' individual claims. At that point, as the Court of Appeals
recognized in this case, "there [are] involved none of the imponderables that
make the [class action] decision so difficult early in litigation." . . . See also
Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (CA4).
431 U.S. at 406 n.12 (citation omitted).
This interpretation is supported by the definition of the introductory signal,
"See also," with which the Court preceded the Cox citation: "Cited authority provides
background to a question analogous to that examined in text, which can profitably be
compared with it." HARVARD LAw REVIEW ASS'N, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 7
(12th ed. 1976). The Court may have been offering the resolution in Cox as an
acceptable alternative to dismissal. Also supportive of the Goodman reading is that
the Court cited to pages 15 to 16 of Cox. It was in the paragraph spanning these two
pages that the Cox court set out the procedure. On the other hand, the Court could
have been citing Cox as support for its proposition that "the decision whether the
named plaintiff should represent a class is appropriately made on the full record,
including the facts developed at the trial of the plaintiffs' individual claims." 431 U.S.
at 406 n.2. The Cox opinion contains language from which it may be inferred that the
court was making such a decision. 471 F.2d at 15. See Greene v. Brown, 451 F. Supp.
1266, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1978).

1979]

HEADLESS CLASS ACTION

In neither Cox nor Goodman did the Fourth Circuit cite any precedent
for, or ever explain, the procedure it employed in those cases. 215 A wellreasoned opinion by Judge Young of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, however, sheds significant light on the doctrinal
source of the Cox-Goodman device. In Booth v. Prince George's County,216
Judge Young applied Cox to retain a class action on his docket after
dismissing the individual claim for failure to allege a justiciable claim. In a
footnote, he offered his explanation for the propriety of this procedure. 217 He
viewed the question of subject matter jurisdiction as turning on whether
there was an article III case or controversy between the defendant and the
proposed class rather than between the defendant and the named plaintiff,
Booth. Because the complaint had alleged the existence of an "injury in
fact" to the class - although not to Booth himself - the class had
demonstrated the requisite article III standing, and the court therefore had
jurisdiction over the action. Judge Young then construed the requirements of
rule 23(a) as a "real party in interest screening process,"21o meant to assure
that class actions were brought by class members - persons who fit the rule
17 definition of a "real party in interest. ' 219 Because plaintiff Booth had not
alleged that he was discriminated against, he was not a member of the
purported class of discriminatees, thus not a "real party in interest," and his
action was accordingly dismissed. However, because the court's jurisdictional requisites were satisfied by the putative class, the action could
continue. Having conceived of the dismissal of Booth as a rule 17 real party
in interest problem, Judge Young found it proper to invoke the provision of
the rule that requires the retention of an action to allow substitution of a real
party in interest. 220 It is wholly speculative whether Judge Young's mode of

215. Precedent for the Cox-Goodman remedy exists, however. In Norman v.
Connecticut St. Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972), for example, the court of
appeals, after dismissing the original named plaintiff, remanded an action to the
district court "to dismiss ... without prejudice on grounds of inadequacy of
representation .

..

unless within 30 days another member of the class is granted

leave to intervene." Id. at 499. See LaReau v. Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214 (D. Conn.
1974) (district court retained purported class action for 30 days after original plaintiff
dismissed); Taylor v. Springmeyer Shipping Co., 15 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2d 1233 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971) (same for six months). See generally 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.04[2] (2d ed. 1979).
216. 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975).
217. Id. at 475 n.1.
218. Id.
219. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name

of the real party in interest ....
As used in rule 17(a), the real party in interest
principle is a means of identifying the person who possesses the right sought to be
enforced. The rule directs attention to whether the plaintiff has a significant interest
in the particular action he has instituted. See generally 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 4, §§ 1541-1573.
220. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
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analysis was also the Fourth Circuit's in Cox or Goodman. The close
similarity between the last sentence of rule 17(a) and the Cox-Goodman
procedure, however, indicates that rule 17 may well have suggested the idea
of the device.
Although it provides the only judicial attempt at explaining the CoxGoodman procedure, the Booth opinion also presents a question as to its
analytical soundness. In reaction to the Supreme Court's decisions in Sosna
v. Iowa 221 and Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs, 222 subsequent to
his initial judgment in Booth, Judge Young issued a supplemental opinion,
dismissing the retained "class action." He read Sosna and Jacobs as
establishing that a purported class did not become a legal entity distinct
from the named plaintiff until it had been certified under rule 23(c)(1). 223 The
first step in his analysis of the Cox-Goodman procedure was therefore no
longer valid because the putative class could not satisfy the standing
requirement separate and apart from the named plaintiff. The proper
resolution of the case, upon the named plaintiffs failure to satisfy the
224
standing requirement, was dismissal.
If rule 17(a) is strictly applied in this situation, however, it does not
necessarily follow that Judge Young's reading of Sosna and Jacobs
precludes the use of the Cox-Goodman procedure. Despite some confusion
about the relationship between the rule 17 real party in interest requirement
and standing, 225 it seems correct that a person who is found not to be the

after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest ....
This section of rule 17 operates to allow a correction of parties even after the statute of
limitations governing the action has run. See generally 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 4, § 1555. Professor Wright explains this provision as reflecting "the
general policy of the draftsmen of the federal rules that the choice of a party at the
pleading stage ought not have to be made at the risk of a final dismissal of the action
should it later appear that there had been an error." Id. at 705-06. The provision also
allows the substitution of parties to relate back to the time the original action was
filed. See, e.g., Honey v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 63 F.R.D. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1974).
If the real party in interest is not joined or substituted within a reasonable time, the
court should dismiss the suit. What is a "reasonable time" is a matter of judicial
discretion. In American Dredging Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), for example, the court allowed the original plaintiff 30 days to join his insurer,
who as subrogee was the real party in interest. The Advisory Committee Note to rule
17 explains this provision as having been added "simply in the interests of justice
It is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue
....
is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made." Advisory Comm.
Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 85 (1966).
221. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
222. 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
223. 66 F.R.D. at 475.
224. Id. at 476.
225. The relation of the standing doctrine to the real party in interest requirement
is unclear. Professor Wright has found an "overlap" between the two concepts:
To the extent that standing .

.

. is understood to mean that the litigant

actually must be injured by the [defendant], then it closely resembles the
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"real party in interest" for rule 17 purposes, because he does not possess the
right under substantive law that he is seeking to enforce, will also not have
standing. 226 Rule 17 at least implicitly sanctions the continuation of an
action despite the presence of some period of time when there is no person
before the court with standing. In the class action context, therefore, it is not
essential that the putative class, or indeed anyone, have standing while the
action is being retained in order to permit a proper representative to present
himself. In purely rule 17 terms the first step in Judge Young's analysis in
Booth - that the purported class must have standing to provide the court
with jurisdiction - is unnecessary, and the Supreme Court's establishment
of certification as the birthdate of a separate class entity is irrelevant.
IV. A

PROPHYLACTIC RULE AND A SUGGESTED

PROCEDURAL REMEDY

A. How to Avoid the Problem

A named plaintiff frequently loses his personal stake in the outcome of
the case before certification only because the district court has been dilatory
in ruling on the class action issue227 or because it has acted too quickly and
without the benefit of an adequate evidentiary record. To remedy this
problem, a certification determination should come at an early stage of the
action, but after sufficient discovery has been completed to illuminate the
facts adequately. Because a certification determination is "conditional,"
"alterable," and "amendable," 228 a rule prescribing that it be made
at a
certain point would not force a judge to make hasty and irrevocable
decisions.
In an early and influential discussion of the class action device, Judge
Frankel observed: "It may be necessary to provide by local rule that there be
a motion at some relatively early stage for at least some preliminary ruling
[on certification].

' 229

He cautioned that if a certification determination is

notion of real party in interest under rule 17(a), inasmuch as both terms are
used to designate a plaintiff who has shown that he possesses a sufficient
interest in the action to entitle him to be heard on the merits.

6 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1542, at 641. Another treatise has
characterized the relationship in this manner: "[T]here is a proceduralconcept of the
proper party plaintiff that is independent of the substantive concept of who it is that
has the rights in the matter in controversy that he may enforce through a lawsuit." F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.2, at 396 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in

original).

226. He will not have an "interest ...
within the zone of interests to be protected
...
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org'ns, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). See note 21 supra.
227. In one empirical study of class actions, it was found that in those cases
examined the time between the filing of the complaint and a determination of the
certification issue varied from one month to nearly four years. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1141-42 (1974).
228. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1).
229. Frankel, Some PreliminaryObservationsConcerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 41 (1968).
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delayed, "members of a putative plaintiff class may be led by the very
existence of the lawsuit to neglect their rights until after a negative ruling
on this question ....
Since Judge Frankel's article appeared, thirteen
federal district courts have promulgated local rules prescribing that the
plaintiff must move for certification within 60 to 90 days after the filing of
the complaint.23 ' Requiring an early ruling on certification may, however,
mean that the judge's knowledge on the issue is limited to bare allegations
in the pleadings or to a very limited amount of discovered information. To
reconcile the advantages of an early certification decision with the necessity
for adequate discovery, the adoption of a rule similar to one proposed in the
Manual for Complex Litigation, which prescribes that the plaintiff move for
certification within 90 days of the filing of a complaint, 232 may be advisable.
B. Resolution of the Plaintiff's Pre-CertificationLoss of His Personal
Stake in the Outcome of a Class Action
Courts should hesitate to bar the continuation of a purported class
action because the named plaintiff has lost his personal stake in the case
before certification without at least some consideration of the consequences
of dismissal. Courts have all too often simply dismissed an action when the
named plaintiff loses his personal stake in the case before a class is certified.
A recurring rationale for these dismissals is that terminating the action will
cause no harm to the putative class members, that "the slate is clear" 233 for
them to commence actions on their own behalf.
Upon superficial examination, this reasoning may appear persuasive;
however, the "slate" may not always be "clear." Precluding the continuation
of a purported class action after the named plaintiff has lost his stake in the
case may impede the operation of one of the basic tenets of our judicial
structure, appellate review of trial court decisions; may preclude or delay
judicial resolution of the putative class members' claims; and may disserve
the underlying policy of rule 23.
In every state and in the federal system, appellate review of trial court
judgments is available in some form. 234 However, as many courts have
pointed out, if the plaintiffs loss of his stake in the case bars him from
appealing an earlier denial of class certification, a judge's determination on

230. Id. at 40.
231. D.D.C.R. 1-13(b); S.D. FLA. R. 19 A.3; N.D. GA. R. 220, 221.13; S.D. IND. R.
7(b); E.D. LA. R. 2.12(c); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 11A(c); E.D.N.Y. CIv. R. 11A(c); S.D. OHIO R.
3.9.3; E.D. PA. R. 45(c); M.D. PA. R. 701.07(c); W.D. PA. R. 34(c); D.R.I.R. 30(c); W.D.
WASH. Cxv. R. 23(f)(3). The penalty imposed for failing to meet these rules has not
been uniform. Compare Walker v. Columbia Univ., 62 F.R.D. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(untimely motion cause for dismissal of class allegations) with Gilinsky v. Columbia
Univ., 62 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (untimely motion overlooked).
232. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. 2, § 1.40 (CCH 1978).
233. Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977).
234. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 225, § 13.6, at 673.
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that issue may be effectively immune from review. 235 Generally, appellate
review of a trial court determination may be had only upon appeal from a
236
final judgment in the trial court.
Until recently, under the so-called "death knell" doctrine, some courts
permitted an exception to this rule, allowing interlocutory appeals from
orders that had denied or dismissed class certification. 23 7 However, in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,238 the Supreme Court held that the creation
of the "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule was an
impermissible exercise of legislative decisionmaking by the courts. Moreover, in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 239 the Court found
that a denial of class certification in an action seeking injunctive relief could
not be immediately appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which permits
interlocutory review of the denial of injunctions. 24° As a result of the Court's
renewed emphasis on the final judgment rule, whether the alleged error in
denying certification will be reviewed will depend upon a member of the
putative class intervening after judgment to seek appeal. 241 Because these
persons are not entitled to notice, it is doubtful that they even know that a
class action has been filed on their behalf. Even if they are informed of the
existence of the lawsuit, they may be unaware that the putative class is
without a representative who can maintain the appeal for them. As aptly
stated by the Fifth Circuit: "Review of alleged judicial error ought not be
242
foreclosed so fortuitously.

235. E.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted,99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979); Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111
(5th Cir. 1978),cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1421 (1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville,
578 F.2d 987, 995 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S.
Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008); see Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d
209, 214 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, J., concurring), aff'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
236. The so-called "final judgment" rule stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), which
provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States .... " See generally Crick, The
FinalJudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Note, Appealability in
the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L REV. 351 (1961).
237. The theory underlying the doctrine was that a denial of class action status
was the "death knell" of the lawsuit because the claims of the individuals were too
small practically to permit the maintenance of separate suits. See generally Comment,
Appealability of a Class Action Dismissal: The "DeathKnell" Doctrine,39 U. CHI. L.
REv. 403 (1972).
238. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
239. 437 U.S. 478 (1978). See text accompanying notes 151 to 156 supra.
240. See note 151 supra.
241. Intervention to appeal in this manner was authorized by the Supreme Court
in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), discussed in note 127 supra.
242. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S.
Ct. 142 (1979). Two other methods of seeking review of a district court's class
determination - certification of the issue by the trial judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970) and issuance of a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) - are
available only in limited circumstances and are infrequently employed. See generally
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1802.
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There are several other compelling reasons to allow a proposed class
action to continue beyond the loss of the named plaintiff's personal stake in
the case. Fundamentally, unless the action is permitted to continue, a group
of persons with at least arguably valid claims may lose a chance to have
their day in court. It is certainly possible that the original plaintiff is the
only person with sufficient time, money, or interest to press the action on
behalf of the class. Moreover, when the members of the proposed class are
mentally incompetent, ignorant of legal rights, or unable to assert their
rights for fear of sanction, the class action sought to be litigated by the
stakeless plaintiff may represent the only effective means to obtain judicial
relief for these persons.
Dismissal of an action because the named plaintiff has lost his stake
may be critical in actions brought under Title VII. Most courts that have
ruled on the question have determined that once the class plaintiff has
exhausted his administrative remedies, the absent class members are not
required to go through the administrative process themselves. 243 If the
action is dismissed before certification, however, the judicial forum will not
again become available to the class until a new representative has, like the
dismissed plaintiff, gone through the lengthy process of exhausting all
available administrative remedies. In light of the attitude of many courts
that the maintenance of Title VII actions, should be facilitated, 244 this
consideration may be of considerable moment.
A pre-certification dismissal may also harm those persons in the
putative class who had relied upon the class action to adjudicate their
personal claims. They might otherwise have pursued actions on their own
behalf but may now be barred from doing so by the running of the statute of
limitations. Although the Supreme Court has held that the filing of a class
action tolls the running of the statute of limitations, 245 the statute begins to
run again if the case is dismissed. If a person in the putative class has

243. See, e.g., Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 553 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1977);
Williams v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 552 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1977). See generally 4 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 9, § 7970a; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1776.
244. For a discussion of Title VII cases, see notes 158 to 169 and accompanying
text supra.
245. In American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the Court ruled
that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had
the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." Id. at 554. However, this rule
appears to be applicable only to cases in which the members of the purported class
seek to intervene after the class has been disallowed. It is uncertain whether the rule
would allow a class member to bring an individual action after the statute of
limitations has run. Moreover, there is language in American Pipe that suggests that
the statute may not be tolled when maintenance of the class action is denied "for
failure of the complaint to state a claim on behalf of the members of the class ... [or]
for lack of standing of the representative, or for reasons of bad faith or frivolity." Id.
at 553. See generally 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.90 (2d ed. 1979); 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1795.
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learned through informal publicity about the filing of the class suit but is
not aware of its subsequent termination, he may lose his claim due to the
passage of time. Even if the putative class member learns of the dismissal in
time to overcome the statute of limitations, the intervening delay may make
difficult the gathering of evidence and the preparation of a case. A judicial
failure to recognize the pre-certification reliance by persons in a proposed
class may compel these persons to file overlapping class or individual suits
246
in order to protect themselves.
Dismissal of a proposed class action because the named plaintiff has
lost his stake in the case may force the members of the putative class to
relitigate in a later proceeding issues that had already been fully
adjudicated. Therefore, continuation of the action would further one of the
major policy goals underlying rule 23, the avoidance of a multiplicity of
lawsuits and the fostering of an attendant increase in court efficiency in the
administration of litigation. These policies were recognized in Taylor v.
Kerr,247 in which the district court permitted intervention by members of a
proposed class after the named plaintiff had lost his stake in the case: "It
would be unfair to the parties and a misuse of court time to terminate the
present proceedings at this point and require that the process begin again on
'248
a new complaint.
If, for one of the reasons described above, a court finds it prudent to
allow a purported class action to continue beyond the demise of the named
plaintiffs personal stake in the case, it certainly should not be at a loss for a
rationale to justify its decision. It could rely on an expansive reading of the
"relation back" theory set out in footnote eleven of Sosna v. Iowa. 24 9

Alternatively, it could ascribe to any person who files a complaint with class
allegations an interest in exercising fiduciary responsibilities to the
members of the class he has sought to represent, an interest that would
continue beyond the loss of his individual claim. 2 0 If faced with a claim for
injunctive relief, the court could determine that, despite the loss or

246. Indeed, many courts have recognized the reliance interests of putative class
members by prescribing pre-certification notice of settlements between defendants
and the individual purporting to represent the class. For a collection of cases holding
to this effect, see Almond, supra note 115, at 317-21.
247. 73 F.R.D. 691 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
248. Id. at 695.
249. 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.l1 (1975); see text accompanying notes 30 to 43 supra.This
position was advocated by Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion in Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209, 214-18 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, J.,
concurring), affl'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978); see text accompanying notes 151 to 156 supra,
as well as by the Third Circuit in Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 1421 (1979); see text accompanying notes 77
to 98 supra. See also Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3688 (April 17, 1979) (No. 78-1169), discussed in
text accompanying notes 109 to 120 supra.
250. This theory was also proposed by the imaginative Judge Seitz. Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, J., concurring),
aff'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
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satisfaction of his individual claim, the plaintiff would benefit from the
granting of the class-wide relief and thus continues to have a stake in the
outcome of the case. 251 All of these positions have merit, and, especially in
light of the Supreme Court's own advocacy of the "relation back" theory,
none would appear to affront either the prudential or constitutional aspects
of the justiciability doctrine.
After having determined that an action may continue despite the precertification demise of the named plaintiffs stake in the case, many courts
2 52
have permitted that plaintiff to continue serving as class representative.
However, when rule 23 and the judicial interpretation of its terms are closely
examined, it becomes apparent that a person with no personal stake in the
outcome of a lawsuit can never adequately represent a class of persons
whose interests are at stake. One of the major criteria for determining
satisfaction of the adequacy of representation requirement in rule 23(a)(4) is
whether an aspiring representative will vigorously prosecute the litigation
on behalf of the class. 253 When a person has a personal stake in the outcome
of a controversy and will be harmed or rewarded by its resolution, it may be
assumed that he will prosecute both his own and the class' claims with
vigor. As explained by Professor Homburger, one of the implicit assumptions in allowing class actions to be maintained is that the representative
will stand or fall with the class:
The basic philosophy of class actions has remained unchanged through
the centuries. Self-interest, the motivating force that sparks the
adversary system, also sustains the doctrine of class actions. We may
trust man to help his fellow man if by doing so he helps himself particularly if only by helping others will he be able to protect and
promote his own interests. Building on that simple premise, the device
provides for the use of man's natural instinct to act in his own best
interest in2 4order to achieve justice and procedural efficiency in mass
litigation. 5
Many courts have felt particularly compelled to allow stakeless plaintiffs to
continue in a representative role in actions filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. These courts theorize that because Congress intended the statute
to be enforced by private parties through the judicial forum, no roadblocks
should be created by strict adherence to procedural niceties. 255 However, this

251. This concept was relied upon in Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,
555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977). See notes 161 & 162 and accompanying text supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 158 to 162 supra.
253. The requirements for an adequate class representative are described in note 23
supra.
254. Homburger, State Class Actions and the FederalRule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609,
610 (1971). See also Degnan, Foreword: Adequacy of Representationin Class Actions,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 705, 716 (1972).

255. See text accompanying notes 158 to 163 supra.
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liberal application of rule 23 may cause serious harm to a class of persons
with valid Title VII claims. The absent class members are held to the
judgment in the case whether it is favorable or not.25 6 If a stakeless plaintiff
loses the action - perhaps because he had not acted as arduously as one
with a live stake in the case - because of the operation of res judicata, the
members of the class will be bound. Consequently, the defendant will have
escaped liability, possibly as a direct result of the court's eagerness to permit
257
an unqualified person to represent the class.
A strict application of rule 23 does not, however, dictate termination of
the action whenever the plaintiff loses his personal stake in the case before
certification. Rather, even should the court bar the stakeless plaintiff from
continuing as representative, it may be able to elicit a new champion from
the ranks of the putative class members. A procedural scheme to achieve
this result was suggested by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Goodman v. Schlesinger.2s5 There, perhaps borrowing a
concept from the federal rule on real party in interest, the court permitted an
action to be "retained" on the docket of the district court until another
member of the putative class stepped forward to take over as class
representative. Use of this device would solve the dilemma of courts that
find it appropriate to allow a proposed class action to continue beyond the
demise of the named plaintiffs claim but do not wish to allow that plaintiff
to continue as representative.
There are, however, several shortcomings in the Goodman procedure.
First, it is doubtful that it is proper to permit the retention on a district
court's docket of a case that, despite the Fourth Circuit's misappellation, is
not yet a class action. Even if the analogue to rule 17's retention device
immunizes the Goodman procedure from attack as not satisfying the
constitutional aspects of the justiciability doctrine, 259 the prudential

256. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1789.
257. The hazard of liberally applying rule 23 in Title VII actions was eloquently
summarized by Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit:
Envision the hypothetical attorney with a single client, filing a class action to
halt all racial discrimination in all the numerous plants and facilities of one
of America's mammoth corporations. One act, or a few acts, at one or a few
places, can be charged to be part of a practice or policy quickening an
injunction against all racial discrimination by the employer at all places. It is
tidy, convenient for the courts fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and dandy for
the employees if their champion wins. But what of the catastrophic
consequences if the plaintiff loses and carries the class down with him, or
proves only such limited facts that no practice or policy can be found, leaving
him afloat but sinking the class?
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., concurring).
258. 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 202 to 214 supra.
259. It was here posited that because the Goodman procedure is an application of
the last sentence of rule 17(a), and because that rule is presumed to be constitutional,
the Goodman procedure is constitutionally valid as well. See text accompanying notes
221 to 226 supra.
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dimension of that doctrine ordinarily demands two adverse parties in every
6
action. Second, because attorneys are generally forbidden to solicit clients,2 0
if the attorney for the stakeless plaintiff - assuming that he will continue
as counsel for the proposed class - follows the rules of his profession, the
members of the putative class will have no way of knowing that an action is
26
being "retained" on their behalf.

1

The deficiencies in the Goodman procedure may easily be corrected by
modifying the device in two respects. In order to ensure that the retained
action has the adverseness demanded by the justiciability doctrine, a court
could appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the putative class during the
interim between the dismissal of the original plaintiffs claim and the
appearance of another member of the proposed class. The court should select
someone who would - at least provisionally - be an adequate class
representative. 26 2 A federal district court could find the power to appoint
such a guardian in rule 23(d)(5), which gives the court authority to issue
orders relating to "procedural matters" not specifically provided for in the
other provisions of rule 23(d). 263 It could also invoke rule 17(c), which
mandates that "[t]he court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action . *,"264 arguing
that the headless class is analogous to an incompetant person. Indeed, there
is decisional precedent for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a class
action. In Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank,265 after the defendant agreed

to pay a lump sum settlement, counsel for the class filed a petition for

260. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
2-103(A), 2-103(B), DR 2-104(A) (1975). See generally Developments in the Law Class Actions, supra note 20, at 1577. The Supreme Court has recently recognized
limited first amendment "solicitation" rights by attorneys. Compare In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
261. Indeed, beyond the proscriptions of the ABA's Code of Professional
Responsibility, many federal district courts have promulgated local rules forbidding
communication between attorneys and members and potential members of a class
without court approval. See, e.g., D. MD. R. 20. In a case in which he employed the
Goodman procedure, Judge Young of the District of Maryland invoked this rule in
warning the class attorney not to solicit a new representative without court approval.
See Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466, 473 n.5 (1975).
262. It is possible that the attorney who had served as counsel to the original
plaintiff could fill this role, but it need not be that person.
263. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(5). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
4, § 1796. Invocation of rule 23(d)(5) would, of course, require an argument that
appointment of a guardian ad litem is a procedural matter "similar" to those dealt
with in clauses (1) through (4) of rule 23(d): streamlining the presentation of evidence,
notice, "imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors," and
amendment of the pleadings to eliminate allegations of the representation of absent
persons.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c). See generally Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35,
38-39 (5th Cir. 1958).
265. 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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attorney's fees. The district court appointed another attorney to serve as
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the class with respect to the
amount of fees the class counsel should receive. The original class attorney
moved to vacate the appointment, arguing that the court had overstepped its
authority. The court denied the motion, noting that without the guardian,
there would be no one to dispute the proper amount of fees to be paid from
the class fund. The appointment of the guardian assured that the issues
would be "'presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process."' 266 Although
the judge in the Haas case simply assumed that he had the power to appoint
the guardian, in Miller v. Mackey International,Inc.,26 7 a district court judge
found a source of appointive power inherent within rule 23(d).268

The Goodman procedure should also be modified to provide notice to the
putative class members for whom the action is being retained. Rule 23
furnishes ample authority to a district court to prescribe notice at all stages
of a proposed class action. 269 Notice to putative class members has
frequently been ordered in cases in which the original named plaintiff was
revealed to be an inadequate representative before certification. In Rothman
v. Gould,270 for example, the named plaintiff in a purported class action,
after having been offered a settlement by the defendant, moved for a
determination that the class should not be certified. The court suggested
that because the motion was made nearly two years after the complaint had
been filed, some persons in the putative class may have relied upon the
action in lieu of filing their own claims. Even if the original named plaintiff
was unwilling to go forward with the case, other members of the proposed
class might be prepared to carry on as representatives. Rather than dismiss
the action, therefore, the court ruled that "some decent notice be given to
those [persons] plaintiff purported to represent so that such members of
what was once said to be a 'class' may appear, if they wish, to ... seek to be
substituted as representatives or take other steps appropriate for protection
of their interests. '271 The court ordered that notice of the pendency of the
action appear for one day in the New York Times and one day in the Wall
272
Street Journal.
266.
267.
268.
powers,
269.

Id. at 383 n.1 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
70 F.R.D. 533 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
Id. at 535. The court went on to say: "In addition the court, under its equity
possesses the duty to ensure that justice is done." Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Rule 23(d)(2) provides that a court may order:
that notice be given ... as the court may direct to some or all of the members
of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation
fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action ....
See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1786.
270. 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
271. Id. at 496.
272. Id. at 501. Professor Wright characterized the Rothman court's approach as
"sound." 7C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1768, at 654. One student author
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Should notice to putative class members be ordered after the original
named plaintiffs case is dismissed, who should pay for that notice? In the
Rothman case, the district court ordered the defendant to pay.2 7 3 However,

Rothman was decided before Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,27 4 in which the
Supreme Court held that the cost of the mandatory notice to the members of
the class in actions brought under rule 23(b)(3) must initially be borne by the
plaintiff as a part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit. 275 Once

the original plaintiff in a proposed class action is out of the case, however,
there is no real "plaintiff' as that term was applied in the Eisen case. A
solution was suggested in Lowenschuss v. C. G. Bluhdorn.276 The district

court required the disqualified plaintiff in a purported class action to pay the
cost of notice to the putative class members, reasoning that he "owed a
fiduciary duty to the class.

' 277

Requiring that anyone who files a class

action undertake a duty to pay notice costs would not seem to present a
significant inhibition to the use of the device, at least if the extent of the
required notice were as limited as that prescribed in Rothman - two days in
two newspapers.
Once a putative class member receives notice that an action is being
retained on his behalf, he may intervene under rule 24278 and seek to become
the class representative. Intervention to bolster class representation has
been liberally allowed, and many courts have permitted putative class
members to intervene in order to continue an action after the named
plaintiff has lost his stake in the case. 27 9 Indeed, the right of any putative
class member to intervene in this situation should be absolute under the
2
language of rule 24(a). 80
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has thus far failed to establish a firm doctrinal basis
for resolution of issues stemming from a named plaintiffs pre-certification
loss of a personal stake in the outcome of a class action. The Court has
has argued for a "prophylactic rule requiring notice in all cases" in which the named
plaintiff is shown to be an inadequate representative before certification. Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 20, at 1544; cf. Shelton v. Pargo, 582
F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978) (pre-certification notice of settlements required only if the
district court finds evidence of collusion).
273. 52 F.R.D. at 501.
274. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
275. Id. at 177-79. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1788,
at 168-71.
276. 78 F.R.D. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
277. Id. at 678.
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
279. E.g., Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972);
Castoe v. Amerada Hess Corp., [1977] TRADE CAS. 61,719 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Taylor v.
Kerr, 73 F.R.D. 691 (M.D.N.C. 1977); LaReau v. Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214 (D. Conn.
1974); Washington v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
280. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) mandates intervention of right when "the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [the applicant's ability to
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granted certiorari in two cases discussed above; 281 it may shortly provide
additional guidance to federal courts grappling with the issues this
Comment has explored. In the absence of further direction from the Court,
this Comment has argued for an open-minded judicial approach to cases in
which a named plaintiff loses his stake before certification. In deciding such
cases, courts should look to the consequences of terminating the action. If a
court finds that the persons alleged to form the class will not be harmed,
then dismissal may be warranted. However, should it become apparent that
dismissal will either cause injury to these persons or effectively immunize
the district court's conduct from review, continuation of the action is
appropriate. It has been further posited that if such an action is permitted to
proceed, the stakeless plaintiff should not be permitted to continue as the
class representative. Rather, a procedural device through which the
proposed class is retained under the management of a guardian ad litem
until the putative class members have an opportunity to receive notice and
to determine if intervention is prudent should be adopted. Whether or not
this proffered remedy is accepted, courts faced with the issues here
addressed should strive to resolve them, in Justice Cardozo's words, "not by
metaphysical conceptions of the nature of judge-made law, nor by the fetish
of some implacable tenet ... but by considerations of convenience, of
28 2
utility, and of the deepest sentiments of justice."
protect his interests] unless [that] interest is adequately represented by existing
parties."
281. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1420 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 77 to 98 supra;
Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1421
(1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 124 to 132 supra. Petitions for certiorari
have also been filed in Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-1008), discussed in
text accompanying notes 170 to 201 supra, and Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.,
587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3688 (U.S. April 17,
1979) (No. 78-1169), discussed in text accompanying notes 109 to 120 supra.
282. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148-49 (1921).
ADDENDUM

After this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court decided Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. Roper, 48 U.S.L. W. 4279 (Mar. 18, 1980), aff'g Roper v. Consurve,
Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,
48 U.S.L. W. 4296 (Mar. 18, 1980), aff'g in part and vacating in part 579 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1978). In Roper, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit'sdecision on the narrower
ground that the named plaintiffs had a continuing personal interest in having the
class certified so that they could shift part of the costs of litigation to the members of
the class. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4283; see text accompanying notes 124 to 132 supra. In
Geraghty, the Court affirmed the aspects of the Third Circuit's decision pertinent to
this Comment, 48 U.S.LW. at 4301; see text accompanying notes 77 to 98 supra, but
vacated the lower court decision to the extent that it placed the burden of identifying
and constructingsubclasses on the trialcourt. See 48 US.L. W. at 4301. Certiorariwas
denied in Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978), discussed
in the text accompanying notes 109 to 120 supra, 48 U.S.L. W. 3612 (Mar. 25, 1980),
and Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed in the
text accompanying notes 170 to 201 supra, was vacated and remanded for
reconsiderationin light of Roper and Geraghty.

